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Managing Entrepreneurial Growth: Timing the IPO 
(Under the direction of Dr. Hugh M. O’Neill) 
 
This dissertation examines how young private firms manage their entrepreneurial growth 
through the timing of their initial public offering (IPO). While previous research on IPOs has 
predominantly assumed that the process of “going public” should be timed to maximize financial 
benefits, anecdotal evidence has shown that the timing of IPOs also has competitive implications for 
firms’ strategic growth. Specifically, this study examines whether firms determine the timing of their 
IPO launch in accordance with what the theory of entrepreneurial action or real options reasoning 
would suggest, and how strategic considerations such as competition in both the product market and 
stock market influences such timing decisions. 
 Integrating the theory of entrepreneurial action and real options reasoning, competing 
hypothesis are developed in which strategic considerations such as product market and stock market 
uncertainty will induce firms to either accelerate or defer the timing of their IPO launch depending on 
the influence of the venture capitalists. The timing of the IPO launch is also influenced by the level of 
competition in the product and stock market, as well as the irreversibility of the IPO decision.  
 The analyses showed clear support for the direct relationship between uncertainty and the 
timing of IPO: when faced with uncertainty in the product market, firms act in accordance with what 
the theory of entrepreneurial action would suggest, however, when faced with uncertainty in the stock 
market, firms act in accordance with what the theory of real options reasoning would suggest. 
Compared with firms with lower levels of involvement from venture capitalists, firms with higher 
levels of involvement of venture capitalists are likely to have an early IPO timing. The analysis also 
supported the assumption that the timing of IPO is also influenced by the existence of competition in 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The management of the timing of a young firm’s initial public offering (IPO) has 
important implications for the firm’s growth trajectory. Entrepreneurs face critical tradeoffs 
in their choice of IPO launch timing—to launch an IPO early or to defer it. There are 
contrasting views about the appropriate timing of an IPO launch. The predominant view is 
that launching an IPO early on allows firms to achieve competitive advantages through early 
acquisition of capital and slack resources (Porter, 1980; Strebel, 1983; Kulatilaka and Perotti, 
1998). This is corroborated by the theory of entrepreneurial action in which early action 
under uncertainty brings a high level of entrepreneurial opportunities to a firm (e.g., Hayek, 
1937; Schumpeter, 1934). In contrast, according to the theory of real options reasoning, early 
action under uncertainty entails the risk of misreading the environment, leading to potential 
erosion of competitive advantage (e.g., Bowman and Hurry, 1993). However, issues 
regarding how long a firm should defer its IPO, how strategic considerations or market 
factors influence this decision, and whether firms act in accordance with the theory of 
entrepreneurial action or real options reasoning when faced with uncertainty in their IPO 
launch decisions have not been explicitly examined. 
The theories and perspectives of entrepreneurial action, real options reasoning, and 
competitive dynamics may help us understand how and when entrepreneurs choose to launch 
their IPO. This dissertation analyzes the tensions among the three theories and perspectives 
 
and predicts the relationship between environmental uncertainty, competition, and the timing 
of IPOs with respect to high growth entrepreneurial firms.  
1.2 Motivation for the Study 
This dissertation is motivated by several recent IPO events that run contrary to 
research expectations. Recent anecdotal evidence has shown that some firms launch their 
IPOs during “cold” markets, not necessarily during “hot” markets as assumed in the finance 
literature. For example, Google launched its IPO in 2004, when the market was considered 
cold (with fewer than 200 IPOs in 2004), whereas Yahoo launched its IPO in 1996, when the 
market was considered hot (with over 600 IPOs in 2006). Other evidence shows that some 
firms launch their IPOs in the early stages of their life cycles, contradicting the assumptions 
in the entrepreneurship literature, which suggest IPO launches occur during later stages of the 
firm life cycle (e.g., Bhide, 2000). For example, Yahoo launched its IPO just two years after 
it was founded, rather than 5–7 years later, which is the average age of IPO firms. There is 
also evidence that some firms do not necessarily launch their IPOs during periods of high 
returns as assumed in the finance literature. For example, when Yahoo launched its IPO, the 
average first-day stock return for IPO firms was approximately 20%; three years later, it had 
risen to approximately 75%. This contradicts the notion that firms should launch their IPO 
during periods of high returns. Although substantial research on IPOs has been conducted in 
various academic fields, most of the studies use different assumptions, resulting in several 
gaps in our understanding of why and when firms go public, and how IPO-related conditions 
can be managed to achieve growth. This dissertation attempts to provide explanations for 
some of these recent phenomena and to bridge the gaps in our theoretical understanding of 
the phenomena. 
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1.2.1 IPO as a Competitive Dynamic in Strategy and Entrepreneurship Research 
Although IPOs have strategic significance for entrepreneurial firms, IPOs remain one 
of the least-studied topics in the field of strategy and entrepreneurship research (Ireland, 
Reutzel, and Webb, 2005). Studies in strategy and entrepreneurship have tended to view 
IPOs as a transition stage that brings about financial growth or “cash-out” opportunities for 
the founding entrepreneur (e.g., Certo, Daily, Cannella and Dalton, 2003; Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003). As a result, most studies have focused on either the pre-IPO entrepreneurial 
firm or the post-IPO public corporation, while paying minimal attention to the IPO stage 
itself. Of the studies that do consider the IPO stage, most adopt a finance perspective and 
focus predominantly on “hot markets” (e.g., Ritter, 1984; Louhgran and Ritter, 1995), 
underpricing (e.g., Welch, 1989; Lerner, 1994a; Rajan and Servaes, 1997), or long-term 
underperformance (e.g., Brav and Gompers, 1997). These researchers assumed that the IPO 
is simply a natural end-state of ownership control (e.g., Lerner, 1994b) and that IPOs are 
conducted for purely financial objectives.  
However, recent research and anecdotal evidence suggest that the process employed 
during the IPO stage may have significant implications for the competitive positioning of the 
firm. When managed properly, IPOs can lure valuable customers, create new market 
opportunities (e.g., Bancel and Mitoo, 2001), and attract quality labor (e.g., Draho, 2004). 
These findings suggest that early IPO timing may allow for greater effectiveness of resource 
acquisition. In contrast, some studies indicate that the process employed during the IPO stage 
may subject firms to the leakage of confidential information, placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999). Thus, an 
early IPO timing may be disadvantageous to the IPO firm. Together, these findings suggest 
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that research in strategy and entrepreneurship has not adequately focused on the IPO stage 
itself. Consequently, this stage deserves further research from a strategy and entrepreneurship 
perspective. 
1.2.2 Uncertainty and IPO Decisions: Entrepreneurial Action vs. Real Options 
Reasoning 
Uncertainty is an essential element in the field of strategy and entrepreneurship, and it 
figures prominently in many empirical studies on firm behavior and decision making (e.g., 
Tan and Litschert, 1994; Zahra, Neubaum and El-Hagrassey, 2002). However, conflicting 
outcomes have been produced from research on how firms may respond to uncertainty. 
Research in the field of entrepreneurship, in particular, the theory of entrepreneurial action, 
suggests that high levels of uncertainty bring about high levels of entrepreneurial 
opportunities and that firms that take advantage of these opportunities can gain competitive 
advantage (e.g., Hayek, 1937; Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986). On the contrary, the theory of real 
options reasoning states that when high uncertainty in the markets exists, some firms may 
have difficulty predicting outcomes and thus choose not to act or undertake investments (e.g., 
McDonald and Siegel, 1986; McGrath, 1999). This potential variability in decision 
behavior—firms that act entrepreneurially and firms that take a wait-and-see attitude—raises 
the question of what conditions induce small high-growth firms that have not gone public to 
act in accordance with the theory of entrepreneurial action or the theory of real options 
reasoning when determining their IPO launch. In addition, in the case of firms backed by 
venture capital, decisions regarding the timing of the IPO launch are made jointly by the firm 
owner and the venture capitalists. In such a case, whether joint decision-making results in 
firms acting in accordance with an entrepreneurial action approach or a real options 
reasoning approach has not been previously studied. 
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Beside the two approaches, entrepreneurs’ behavior and decision making under 
uncertainty may also depend on the specific source of uncertainty that they face. There has 
been much concern that researchers have not adequately captured the multidimensionality of 
uncertainty (Boyd, Dess, and Rasheed, 1993; Dess and Beard, 1984). For example, Kogut 
(1991) used only product market demand uncertainty in measuring firms’ propensity to 
acquire joint ventures, whereas Folta and Miller (2002) used only stock index uncertainty to 
measure this effect. While these measures may be central to the decision-making process, 
many researchers treat uncertainty as unidimensional and ignore the varying effects that the 
different sources of uncertainty may have on firm behavior and performance. Research on 
IPOs has predominantly featured the stock market as the main source of uncertainty (e.g., 
Pastor and Verosini, 2005), whereas in reality, financial decisions and product-market 
decisions are not made separately (Povel and Raith, 2004). Therefore, the influence of 
multidimensional uncertainty sources on the results of decision making, especially for firms 
that are at their high growth stage and are contemplating an IPO, merits examination. 
1.2.3 Timing as a Decision-Making Criterion: Continuous vs. Punctuated 
Research in strategy and entrepreneurship has, in general, ignored timing as a 
decision-making criterion. The research has mainly used firm profitability (e.g., Rumelt, 
1974; Bettis, 1981; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988), market share (e.g., Cool and 
Schendel, 1987), and firm valuation (e.g., Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Nelson, 2003) as 
dependent variables. While these are essential criteria for managers in pursuing firm growth, 
the studies make the assumption that decision making is static and does not vary in timing.  
Of the studies that include timing as a decision criterion, most take a continuous 
approach and view actions across time as events that depend on market situations that are not 
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cyclical or linked to the past events (Mosakowski and Earley, 2000). Studies under this 
category view time as a scarce resource, and assume that firm actions are mainly biased 
toward early timing in order to gain “early-mover” advantages such as network effects, 
technological advantage, higher productivity, and brand recognition (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; Bird and West, 1998). Studies from the financial literature also are 
generally biased toward early IPO timing (e.g., Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999; 
Maksimovic and Pichler, 2000; Schultz, 2000). This bias arises from the assumption of early 
generation or returns of capital: entrepreneurial firms wish to generate needed capital, and 
firm owners and venture capitalists want to take firms public as soon as possible in order to 
reap early returns on investments (Freeman, 1999). This assumption has also been the 
foundation of IPO studies in the field of strategy and entrepreneurship (e.g., Stuart, Hoang, 
and Hybels, 1999; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). While early timing may have advantages 
for venture capitalists and owners, the strategic value of deferring an IPO under competitive 
uncertainty has not been adequately researched. Given the gaps in our knowledge of the 
timing of IPOs under competitive conditions, the issue of timing as a decision-making 
criterion deserves further research attention. 
However, some studies in strategy and entrepreneurial research have also taken the 
punctuated equilibrium view, in which firms evolve through long periods of stability, and 
that strategic moves or large transformations are undertaken when sudden discontinuous 
shocks occur in the environment (e.g., Romanelli and Tushman, 1986). IPOs can be regarded 
as a strategic transformation of a firm, but whether firms respond to a punctuated time flow 
in IPO decisions is unclear. One view holds that firms are likely to respond more to sudden 
changes or sudden shocks in the environment as they will be able to gain higher long-term 
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performance; firms that face small changes in the environment will not accumulate 
incrementally and result in large transformations (Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli, 1992). 
However, another view holds that sudden changes or sudden shocks in the environment may 
bring about information and opportunities that are equally available to all firms, rather than 
asymmetries of information (Hayek, 1937). In such an event, entrepreneurial opportunities or 
rents available would be driven to zero (Casson, 1982)—which may defeat the purpose of an 
IPO as a competitive advantage.  Given these discrepancies in time flow approaches 
(continuous vs. punctuated) with respect to the timing of IPOs, the conditions that lead to the 
consequences deserve further attention.1 
1.2.4 Real Options in the Field of Strategy and Entrepreneurship 
According to Ireland, Webb, and Coombs (2005), entrepreneurship research is a 
young discipline with correspondingly low levels of paradigm development. They suggest 
that the appropriate extension of theories from other scholarly disciplines would support the 
effective growth of entrepreneurship research. Although real options reasoning has not 
traditionally figured highly in managers’ and entrepreneurs’ decision-making processes 
(Kester, 1984; Copeland and Keenan, 1998; Triantis, 2005), there is evidence that managers 
do value flexibility (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1998) and growth opportunities (Ireland, Hitt, 
Camp, and Sexton, 2001) when considering major action. However the extent to which 
young firms use real options reasoning in making decisions under uncertainty has not been 
examined. By examining the actions of firms with respect to IPO launches, this study 
                                                 
1 There is also research on firm investment based on the cycles of the industry. This approach provides some 
variance on the timing of actions, but is also partially predetermined according to the age of the industry and/or firm. This 
approach will not be studied in this dissertation but will be controlled for in the model.  
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enhances our understanding of the ways and conditions that entrepreneurial firms may 
choose to act in accordance with the theory of real options reasoning. 
In addition, despite considerable progress in applying real options reasoning to the 
field of strategy, most of the research has been conceptual work on the behavior of the firm 
(Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; McGrath, 1999; Amram and 
Kulatilaka, 1999; McGrath, Ferrier, and Mendelow, 2004; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2004; 
Adner and Levinthal, 2004) rather than empirical research on the implications of the theory 
for the firm (Miller and Reuer, 1996; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). Empirical work using real 
options has focused mostly on investment decisions that are not integrated within a firm’s 
organizational activities, such as market entry (Kogut, 1991; Miller and Folta, 2002; Folta 
and O’Brien, 2004) and technology adoption (Scarso, 1996).  
1.3 Research Questions and Model 
The theoretical framework employed in this research is based on the integration of the 
theory and perspectives of entrepreneurial action, real options reasoning, and the competitive 
dynamics. Uncertainty in the product and stock markets and how firm-specific factors (i.e., 
the influence of venture capitalists in decision making) and industry-wide factors (i.e., 
competition and irreversibility of the IPO decision) influence such decisions are considered. 
An understanding of the dynamics of these factors is critical to the understanding of firms’ 
decisions regarding the timing of their IPO launch. Thus, this dissertation attempts to shed 
light on the following research questions: 
1. Does uncertainty in the product market and the stock market increase or decrease 
young firms’ likelihood of launching an IPO?  
2. Does the level of venture capitalist commitment affect the IPO launch decision? 
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3. How does competition in the product market, the stock market, and irreversibility 
in the IPO decision influence firms’ likelihood of IPO? 
4. When IPO launches are considered as a strategic decision, does the launch reflect 
a continuous or a punctuated timeframe? 
In Figure 1 I offer an overview of the general research model that will be used to explore 
these research questions. Although the financial aspects of going public have significant 
importance in firms’ IPO decisions, this research will forgo a detailed examination of the 
financial arguments in order to focus on IPOs as a strategic consideration. There are several 
financial factors that influence entrepreneurs’ IPO timing decisions that can be incorporated 
into any research model (e.g., age of firm, age of venture capitalists, industry market-to-
book-ratio, and level of borrowing); some of these financial factors were controlled for in the 
model. 
To address the four research questions, I used a hazard model. I analyzed the 
relationship between firm-specific factors (e.g., the involvement of the venture capitalist in 
decision making), strategic considerations (e.g., uncertainty and competition in the product 
and stock markets), irreversibility in the IPO decision, market shocks, and likelihood of IPO 
(or time-to-IPO). I measured the dependent variable in terms of the likelihood of the IPO 
taking place at any given point of time rather than the actual length of time between the 
founding of the firm and the IPO launch because of the inclusion of firms in the data set that 
had not launched an IPO by the end of the observation period. The analysis was conducted 
on a sample of over 2,600 private firms in the manufacturing industry that were founded 
during 1980–1996. Firms that eventually went public (829 firms) and firms that remained 
private at the end of the study timeframe were included in the analysis. 
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1.4 The Importance of the Study 
This dissertation makes several contributions to the field of strategy, 
entrepreneurship, and IPO research. First, it enhances our understanding of the strategic 
considerations in IPO timing decisions, including the flexibility that comes with a later IPO 
launch timing and the competitive advantages arising from an early launch. Second, this 
research also provides insights into the decision-making mechanisms of high growth 
entrepreneurial firms with respect to the product market and stock market, and how these 
decisions are affected when made jointly with venture capitalists. Third, this study highlights 
the roles of competition for resources and market competition in the decision to launch an 
IPO. These factors have not been addressed in previous studies on IPOs. Fourth, this 
dissertation extends previous theoretical and conceptual work on firms’ use of option 
reasoning into an empirical examination of the implications of options decisions within an 
organization. Finally, this work provides valuable insights into the genesis and behavior of 
high-growth firms and the early stages of their organizational development. 
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation 
This introductory chapter provides a brief overview of the motivation for the study, 
the research questions and model, and the contribution of the study to the fields of strategy 
and entrepreneurship. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the literature on IPOs from the field of 
entrepreneurship, strategy, and finance. It then reviews the literature on entrepreneurial 
actions, real options reasoning, and competitive strategy. In chapter 3, I draw on the review 
in chapter 2 to provide a critique of the literature and propose theories that may address the 
gaps and contradictions in the literature that explain how and when entrepreneurs choose to 
launch their IPO. In chapter 4, I develop testable hypotheses that explain firms’ likelihood of 
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launching an IPO. In chapter 5, I provide the details of the research methodology used to test 
the hypotheses, and in chapter 6, I provide the results of the testing. Lastly, in chapter 7, I 








CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
Research on firm’s decisions has been conducted at many stages of a firm’s 
development, from small start-up firms that are fully private to large firms with shares owned 
by the public. As this dissertation focuses on decisions of firms that have passed their start-up 
phase and are approaching the possibility of an IPO, the literature review in this chapter 
mainly focuses on the external causes of firms’ entrepreneurial behavior rather than on biases 
and heuristics at the individual level.  
As IPOs have been researched in the field of entrepreneurship, strategy, and finance, 
this chapter briefly reviews the literature from all three fields. The chapter starts with a 
review of the theory and findings underlying firms’ IPO decisions in the entrepreneurship, 
strategy, and finance literature. Next, the literature relevant to IPO decision timing in each 
field is reviewed. Lastly, theories relevant to entrepreneurial growth through an IPO in a 
strategic context and its timing are reviewed. The discussion in this chapter sets the basis for 
the next chapter, which is a critical review of the gaps and contradictions in the theories 
relevant to IPO decisions and timing. 
2.1  IPOs in Entrepreneurship Literature 
Research on IPOs in the entrepreneurship field has mainly focused on the harvesting 





2.1.1  Lifecycle 
In the entrepreneurship literature, IPOs are viewed like “harvesting crops” of a 
business investment in order “to collect terminal after-tax cash flows on the investment that 
was initially ‘planted’” (Prasad, Vozikis, Bruton, and Merikas, 1996). The process is viewed 
as part of the organizational life cycle that typically occurs during the final stage of the 
entrepreneurial development (Smith and Smith, 2000:566). The organizational life cycle is 
based on the assumption that there are five common stages in a firm’s development: birth, 
growth, maturity, revival, and decline (Churchill and Lewis, 1983; Miller and Friesen, 1984; 
Lester, Parnell, and Carraher, 2003). Research in this area is concerned with understanding 
the characteristics of firm behavior under each predetermined growth stage. Therefore, the 
progression and duration between each stage is assumed to be predetermined. The 
organizational life cycle theory has been used in various fields to understand the process and 
planning of firms (e.g., Smith, Mitchell, and Summer, 1986; Hanks 1990, Birley and 
Westhead, 1990; Hanks, Watson, Jansen, and Chandler, 1993). Research on IPOs using the 
lifecycle theory mostly focuses on the alternatives for fund raising during the firm’s high 
growth stage (e.g., Prasad, Vozikis, Bruton, and Merikas, 1996) or how the firm’s geographic 
location can accelerate the time to harvest an IPO within the high growth phase (Shepherd 
and Zacharakis, 2001).  
2.1.2  Separation of Ownership and Control 
In contrast with viewing IPOs as an opportunity to harvest, some entrepreneurs may 
view their firm as a life-time commitment and prefer to seek alternative investments—the 
loss of ownership and control of their firm signaled by an IPO would be a last resort. 
Research in this field describes the difficulties entrepreneurs have in relinquishing control 
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and the alternative ways of financing the firms. According to Bhide (2000), entrepreneurs 
must be highly ambitious to start a firm, and such strong ambitions are typically followed by 
unwillingness to relinquish control regardless of their ability to support firm growth. This 
unwillingness is also driven by entrepreneurs’ efforts to ensure that the growth and 
development of the firm conforms to their own vision rather than according to other views or 
trends into the future. In addition, ownership cannot be easily transferred as the value of firm 
is tied to the identity of the entrepreneur who built it. The identity tied to the firm may 
include the entrepreneurs' personal knowledge and skills, reputation, and legitimacy. These 
are regarded as critical resources of the firm that cannot be transferred to other individuals, 
and thus firms are likely to launch an IPO only when necessary. 
2.2  IPOs in the Strategy Literature 
This section reviews IPO studies in the strategy literature. I will review the IPO 
literature in this field starting from the timing of the IPO, and the valuation and pricing of the 
IPO to the post-IPO consequences such as the survival, corporate development, and new 
venture founding of the IPO firm (see Table 2 for a summary). 
2.2.1  Timing  
The first major decision for a firm planning to launch an IPO is when to do so. To date, 
only two empirical studies have been carried out on the timing of IPOs in the field of strategy 
(Stuart et al., 1999; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). Stuart et al. (1999) used a social 
network perspective to examine how firms use the prominence of their strategic alliance 
partners to speed the timing of their IPO. They found that investors look to the prominence of 
the firms’ partners as a signal about the quality of the firm—firms with prominent partners 
can launch their IPOs earlier than those without. Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001) examined 
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firms’ IPO timing and found that it is also influenced by the firms’ type of industry and 
geography location. Their results show that firms in the West and Midwest were typically 
launched IPOs earlier than others, and the speed of IPO launch varied by industry. 
2.2.2 Pricing 
The next major decision in the IPO process for a young entrepreneurial firm is how to 
maximize the proceeds and benefits from an IPO. Valuation and under-pricing of the IPO is 
the most empirically researched area in the field of strategy. This is not surprising as the 
valuation and under-pricing of the firm during the IPO process is directly related to the firm’s 
wealth creation. The valuation of a firm’s stock at the time of the IPO is measured as the 
difference between the firm’s market valuation and its book value. High market valuation in 
comparison with the book value brings about greater financial resources that may be used 
either to support the firms’ financial activities or as a financial reward for the owners and 
venture capitalists. Underpricing is the difference between the price at which the firm 
initially sold its stock during the first day of the IPO and the actual trading price of the firm’s 
stock at the closing of the first day of the IPO; the greater the difference, the higher the level 
of underpricing. The level of underpricing is important to the IPO process because high 
levels of underpricing makes the firms/entrepreneurs “leave money on the table,” forgoing 
money that might have been retained.  
Research in strategy has predominantly used signaling theory combined with the 
chief executive officer (CEO) founder status and the composition of the top management 
team (Andrews and Welbourne, 2000; Cyr, Johnson, and Welbourne, 2000; Certo, Daily, and 
Dalton, 2001; Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Nelson, 2003; Cohen and Dean, 2005) or the 
signaling theory combined with the social networks of the firm (Cyr, Johnson, and 
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Welbourne, 2000; Certo, 2003; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Pollock and Rindova, 2003) as the 
determinants of firm performance and the underpricing at IPO. However, a review of the 
literature reveals little consistency on the effects of firm signaling and underpricing (e.g., 
Daily, Certo, Dalton, and Roengpitya, 2003). 
The CEO founder status influences both the firm valuation and underpricing during 
the IPO. Certo, Cohen, Daily, and Dalton (2001) found that having a founder CEO during the 
IPO may require underpricing because investors have uncertainty in the founder CEO’s 
ability to make an effective transition to a professional style of management. However, the 
degree of underpricing is lower when there is a high proportion of inside directors, as inside 
directors are likely provide better support in terms of firm-specific knowledge. While Certo 
et al. (2001) focused on the effects of CEO founder status on wealth retention, Nelson (2003) 
focused on the effects of the presence of the CEO founder during the IPO on wealth creation. 
Nelson (2003) found that having a CEO founder during the IPO may instill confidence in 
investors as founders are more likely to exercise strong strategic leadership in firm 
governance post-IPO than are nonfounders. In addition to the status of the CEO founder, the 
announcement of the CEO’s remuneration can also play an important role in signaling the 
value of the firm to investors. Certo, Daily, Cannella, and Dalton (2003) found that 
announcing the CEO’s compensation package during the IPO process lead to higher 
valuations of the firm.  
Beside the CEO founding status, the composition of the top management team and 
the board of directors influences the valuation and underpricing of IPO firms. Cohen and 
Dean (2005) and Lester, Certo, Dalton, Dalton, and Cannella (2006) followed the approach 
by Certo et al. (2001) and Nelson (2003) and examined the role of the top management team 
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in signaling the quality of the firm to potential investors. They found that legitimacy of the 
top management team, as measured by experience, age, affiliation with nonprofits, and 
education, is negatively related to IPO underpricing. The board composition can also signal 
the firm’s quality to investors (Filatochev and Bishop, 2000; Certo, Daily, and Dalton, 2001). 
Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) found that executives’ ownership of shares provided investors 
with signals of quality. Diversity of the board provided investors with signals that the board 
members have experience, connections, and the incentives to take an active role in the 
decision-making process that leads to less underpricing. Similarly, Certo, Daily, and Dalton 
(2001) found that the size and reputation of the board can provide signals regarding the 
quality of the firm to investors, leading to lower underpricing. 
Firms can also use strategic alliances as signals of their quality, to influence the 
valuation and underpricing of the firm. This was evident in the findings of Stuart et al. (1999) 
that the prominence of firms’ strategic alliance partners increased the valuation of the IPO. 
Gulati and Higgins (2003) extended the findings of Stuart et al. (1999) by examining the 
effects of the different types of alliance partners on firm valuation. They found that ties to 
venture capitalists are beneficial to higher firm valuations during cold markets, and ties to 
prominent investment banks are beneficial to higher firm valuations during hot markets. This 
is because venture capitalists are likely to be overly optimistic about the upside of firms 
launching an IPO when the market is favorable. A social structural perspective has also been 
used to examine underpricing. Pollock and Rindova (2003) found that the amount of 
information in the media influenced lower levels of underpricing and higher stock turnover 
on the first day trading, both at a diminishing rate.  
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2.2.3 Firm Survival 
How the IPO process affects the survival of the firm post-IPO is important to a firm’s 
long-term strategy. According to Jain and Kini (2000) and Fischer and Pollock (2004), the 
survival rate of IPO firms after the first five years post-IPO is about 70–75%. This can be 
attributed to the large transformation in the firm’s organizational structure and culture, 
business boundaries, activity systems, and competitive positioning (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; 
Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Draho, 2004). Despite such importance, to date, only three studies 
in the field of strategy and entrepreneurship have focused on how the IPO process employed 
may impact firms’ survival (Welbourne and Andrews, 1996; Andrews and Welbourne, 2000; 
Fisher and Pollock, 2004). 
Welbourne and Andrews (1996) examined firms’ human resource strategy during the 
IPO process and found that firms that place more value on their employees and have 
organization-based compensation programs during the IPO period may have a lower Tobin’s 
q during the short term, but are more likely to survive in the long term. They followed up 
their study by examining the choice of such tradeoff and found that CEOs with finance 
training will identify with the investment community and perform well at IPO, but will have 
lower levels of human resource values needed for the long-term survival (Andrews and 
Welbourne, 2000). Fischer and Pollock (2004) found that the presence of the CEO founder, 
the concentration of stock ownership in the CEO’s or venture capitalists’ hands, and key 
interorganizational networks can protect the firm during the IPO process and enhance the 
firm’s ability to survive. 
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2.2.4 New Venture Founding 
To date, only one study has addressed how firms that have gone public can support an 
increase in new venture foundings (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). Stuart and Sorenson (2003) 
examined biotechnology firms and found that IPOs increased the creation of new ventures 
due to two effects: enhanced legitimacy and financial resources. First, firms have established 
relationships with various parties such as potential customers, strategic partners, and venture 
investors, and going through an IPO demonstrates the firm’s ability to withstand uncertainty 
and the entrepreneurs’ ability to lead the organization. Second, IPOs enable high-level 
employees to sell their equity holdings and to exploit their expertise and contacts necessary 
to mobilize financial resources and human resources to create new firms. In addition, there 
are spill-over effects as going public influences the aspirations of other entrepreneurs by 
signaling the availability of resources for a particular type of company (Ritter, 1984). 
2.3  IPO in the Finance Literature 
This section reviews IPOs in the finance literature. Because the finance aspect of 
IPOs has been extensively researched and is well documented, it would be impossible to 
review it all. Thus, I develop a broad picture of the major research based on three types of 
benefits of an IPO launch to a firm: (1) financial benefits, (2) managerial benefits, and (3) 
competitive benefits. (See tables 3–5 for a summary). 
2.3.1 Financial Benefits 
  Firms may launch an IPO based on financial needs such as overcoming financial 
constraints (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Black and Gilson, 1998), reducing financial costs (e.g., 
Amihud and Mendleson, 1988; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999), or obtaining cash-out 
opportunities (e.g., Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales; 1998; Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist, 
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1994). Financial constraints may occur if an entrepreneur has private information that is not 
recognized by financers. In this situation, funding from external sources becomes 
constrained, and if available, comes only at higher costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In 
addition to information asymmetries, Black and Gilson (1998) documented that banks’ 
conservative approach in lending to entrepreneurial firms does not reward entrepreneurial 
behavior, but punishes failure. Such a lending approach constrains the growth potential of 
entrepreneurial firms. These two constraints are likely to increase as firms enter into their 
high growth phases. Thus, by launching an IPO, firms gain to the ability to mitigate the 
constraints and raise capital directly.  
Going public also helps firms reduce overall financing costs through increased 
bargaining power. By launching an IPO, firms gain fully diversified shareholders, which 
provide firms with greater bargaining power to lower their costs of financing (Rajan, 1992; 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). Amihud and Mendleson (1988) view the IPO as a liquidity 
enhancing project in which increased liquidity allows firms to effectively reduce their cost of 
capital. This was supported by Booth and Chua (1996), who found that public firms with 
improved liquidity tended to have lower required rates of return. There are many possible 
explanations for this reduced rate of borrowing for public firms. Diamond (1991) stated that 
entrepreneurs first obtain financing from banks, which entails high costs in monitoring the 
firm, thus increasing the borrowing rate banks impose. However, after a certain stage, firms 
can free ride on the monitoring provided by the banks and raise capital through other means 
at lower rates. This finding was supported by Pagano and Röell (1998), who found that if the 
amount of funding required is very large, the cost of monitoring will reach a point when new 
public financing will become cheaper. Rajan (1992) found that by having a balance between 
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financing from banks and the capital market, firms can reduce the bargaining power of banks 
and gain an overall lower financing costing.  
 Firms can also use an IPO launch as a cash-out opportunity. This notion was evident 
in research that found that for some firms, investments may actually decline after an IPO 
launch despite better financing conditions (e.g., Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales; 1998; 
Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist, 1994). Zingales (1995) documented this phenomenon and 
stated that entrepreneurs decide to launch an IPO in order to maximize their gain from selling 
their firm through a change in the proportion of cash flow rights and control rights. Beside 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and the venture capital providers also benefit from cashing 
out through IPOs. Black and Gilson (1998) state that as the firm progresses, the services that 
venture capitalists provide to the entrepreneur lose efficiency, thus an IPO allows venture 
capitalists to exit and reinvest the capital obtained.  
2.3.2 Managerial Benefits 
While the majority of the finance literature on IPO decisions has focused on the 
financial benefits of IPOs, recent finance studies have begun to explore the managerial 
benefits. IPOs can be used by entrepreneurial firms to align managerial incentives (e.g., 
Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997; Pagano and Röell, 1998), enhance investment efficiency 
(Dow and Gorton, 1997; Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000), increase publicity (Ravasi and 
Marchisio, 2003; Rydqvist and Hogholm, 1995) and legitimacy (e.g., Ritter and Welch, 
2002), as well as prepare for potential mergers (e.g., Rock, 1994).  
Going public provides firms with better managerial incentives by eliminating 
excessive monitoring by lenders, which may reduce efficiency in daily decision making 
(Holdstrom and Tirole, 1993; Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997; Pagano and Röell, 1998; 
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Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998). Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) explored the value of the 
stock market as a managerial performance monitoring tool and concluded that high liquidity 
and less concentrated ownership is associated with greater managerial incentives and market 
monitoring. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) and Pagano and Röell (1998) state that the 
elimination of excessive monitoring through public status can enhance managerial efficiency. 
Firms that receive private funding from large external shareholders may be subject to 
excessive monitoring which may actually reduce managerial efficiency. This view is 
supported by Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) who stated that higher liquidity demands by 
multiple investors will lower firms’ cost of management and raise potential benefits from 
correcting managerial failures. In addition, managers can make better decisions when they 
rely on stock prices. This is because, according to Dow and Gorton (1997) and Ang, Cole, 
and Lin (2000), information on stock prices will guide managers to value maximization by 
providing information on investment opportunities and information about their past 
decisions. 
IPO launches also provide firms with increased awareness among consumers (Ravasi 
and Marchisio, 2003; Rydqvist and Hogholm, 1995). Ravasi and Marchisio (2003) surveyed 
CEOs of Italian firms and found that higher visibility played an important role in 
entrepreneurs’ decision to become public. Similar results were also found by Rydqvist and 
Hogholm (1995) who found that firms listed reputation factors in their prospectuses as major 
reasons for going public. These results were supported by the study of Demers and Lewellen 
(2003) on the relationship between launching IPOs and the increase in firms’ website traffic. 
Demers and Lewellen (2003) found that firms’ website traffic, an indicator of product market 
performance for internet firms and of publicity effects, increased during the IPO period. 
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Besides enhancing awareness, launching an IPO can provide signals to consumers about 
firms’ product quality. Maksimovic and Titman (1991) found that all equity firms have 
incentives to produce products of higher quality that may reduce short-term profits but will 
develop consumers’ perception of consistent high quality over time. This view was supported 
by Stoughton, Wong, and Zechner (2001), who stated that consumers discern product quality 
from firms’ stock price. Similarly, Pagano, Röell, and Zechner (2002) examined European 
firms that cross-listed on stock exchanges in the United States and found that firms that 
cross-listed pursued a strategy of rapid expansion and relied heavily on exporting. This 
supports the notion that IPOs provide publicity and enhanced awareness of the firm. 
Beside product awareness among consumers, public firm status also increases firms’ 
legitimacy among customers, suppliers, and resource holders (Ritter and Welch, 2002; Shane 
and Cable, 2002; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). This is because proven records of firm success 
through different stages reduce the uncertainty associated with the firm and demonstrate a 
track record that inspires more confidence and loyalty among affiliates (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994). Such legitimacy also allows management to attract the resources required for further 
corporate development (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). Increase in awareness and legitimacy is 
not limited to stakeholders and consumers, but is also available to potential buyers of the firm 
(Zingales, 1995). This is because an IPO launch provides management with the ability to 
negotiate future acquisitions, as stock and cash can be included in any deals (Rock, 1994). 
Also, by selling stocks to dispersed shareholders in the first stage, and selling the control 
rights directly through bargaining with a potential buyer in the second stage, the entrepreneur 
can minimize haggling during the merger and acquisition negotiations.  
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2.3.3 Competitive Benefits 
In addition to financial and managerial benefits, finance literature and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that IPO launches have implications for a firms’ competitive strategy. By 
launching an IPO, firms gain critical resources such as capital, human resources, and 
knowledge, as well as the legitimacy needed to support valuable growth opportunities. Myers 
(1977) notes that firms have discretion over future investments such as investments in 
research and advertising, which enhances growth opportunities. If so, an IPO can help firms 
manage their latent growth opportunities by providing the resources necessary to fund the 
growth opportunities. Fischer (2000) examined German firms that went public and found that 
growth opportunities based on capital expenditures, sales growth, intangible assets, and 
research and development intensity are important to the determinants of firms launching an 
IPO. This suggests that IPOs can be a vehicle to acquire resources to manage latent growth 
opportunities within the firm. Early acquisition of such resources and rapid growth can 
support firms in their preemption of resources and market opportunities from rivals. 
However, there have been few empirical studies on IPOs as a preemptive move in the 
product market.  
The required disclosure of information after an IPO launch may also benefit a firm’s 
competitive standing. Literature in finance has predominantly focused on the trade-offs 
between gaining cheaper funding and having to disclose proprietary information to 
competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein, 1988; 
Bhattacharya and Chisea, 1995; Yosha, 1995). However, recent literature has shown that 
disclosure of information may benefit certain firms by inducing less aggressive tactics from 
rivals. Draho (2004) argued that rivals could choose to respond more aggressively against 
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firms that have been disclosed to be of low quality in order to drive them out of the market. 
Perotti and Von Thadden (2003) argued that firms of high quality will be faced with high 
expectations and less aggressive tactics from competition, thus benefiting from increased 
disclosure as the public information will deter competition from aggressive behavior. Neither 
has empirically tested these arguments. Therefore, the issue of the relationships before IPOs 
and the competitive positioning deserves to be tested. 
Beside disclosure of information, high leverage may also induce predatory behavior 
from rivals. Firms that have high leverage are more likely to behave cautiously and be less 
aggressive in the product market (Brander and Lewis, 1986; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). 
This is because highly leveraged firms may lower their physical capital investments in order 
to minimize the assets that would be lost to debt holders in case of bankruptcy (Brander and 
Lewis, 1986; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Such behavior reduces firms’ ability to compete 
(Kovenock and Phillips, 1997) and can encourage more aggressive behavior from rivals 
(Teslar, 1996; Kanatas and Qi, 2001; Khanna and Tice, 2000; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; 
Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Rival firms can also take advantage of the leveraged firms’ 
need for refinancing by signaling that a firm will be unprofitable and motivating investors to 
deny the firm financing (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Rival 
firms can also directly pursue aggressive expansion and price reduction tactics against 
leveraged firms (Chevalier, 1995a and 1995b). Therefore an IPO launch could reduce rivals’ 
predatory tactics by reducing leverage.  
2.4 The IPO Timing 
This section reviews how the timing of IPOs has been studied in the entrepreneurship, 
strategy, and finance literature. In reviewing the literature on IPO timings, I use the 
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framework by Mosakowski and Earley (2000) in which time flow can be categorized into 
three assumptions: cyclical/lifecycle, continuous/novel, or punctuated time flows.2 The 
cyclical time flow (or lifecycle time flow), which has been used in traditional strategic 
management research, is a cycle in which patterns of events may repeat across firms at 
certain stages of the firm or of the industry (Miller and Friesen, 1984). In contrary to the 
cyclical time flow, the continuous time flow (or novel time flow) assumes that patterns of 
events across firms or within industries do not exist; future events or occurrences that a firm 
may face are not linked to the firm’s past. The assumption that distinguishes the potential 
future events from past events has been the basis for research on the real options theory 
(Mosakowski and Earley, 2000). Lastly, the punctuated time flow assumes that sudden 
changes may create discontinuous shocks that could lead to differences in firms’ decisions 
and outcomes. The assumption of discontinuous shocks has been the basis for research on 
technological change and entrepreneurial search (Mosakowski and Earley, 2000). 
2.4.1 Life Cycle / Industry Cycle  
Literature on lifecycles in the field of entrepreneurship and finance has assumed that 
an IPO occurs during or immediately after a firm’s rapid growth stage, when the entrepreneur 
will either harvest previous investments or continue to seek investments to support the firm’s 
growth. At this stage, firms will experience changes in information available to outsiders and 
in levels of cash flow. For example, Maug (2001) suggested that firms go public during the 
period in the firm’s lifecycle when outsiders have better information to evaluate the firm’s 
growth prospects than insiders. Schultz (2000) and Beninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005) 
stated that the timing of an IPO occurs when the firm’s cash flow level rises to the point that 
                                                 
2 The rationale for using time flow in understanding IPO timing is described in section 1.2.3. 
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the firm’s value as a privately held equity is equal to the value of the firm as a publicly traded 
company. At this point, firms will launch an IPO because their value from better 
diversification of risk will begin to exceed the private benefits of control. Similarly, Boehmer 
and Ljungqvist (2004) found that announcements of improvements in firms’ sales, earnings 
growth, and profit margins enhance favorable returns in the stock market, which in turn 
increase the likelihood that a firm will go public.  
The timing of IPOs can depend on the level of information about the value of the firm 
that is available in the market (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Benveniste, Busaba, and 
Wilhelm, 2002; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999; Maksimovic and Pichler, 2000). Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) stated that firms will launch their IPO 
when information asymmetries about the value of the firm between the firm and the investors 
are low. Although a firm may want to capitalize on the information asymmetries between the 
firm and investors and launch the IPOs during high asymmetries in order to gain large 
amounts of capital, investors may be aware of the firms’ incentives. With investors’ 
awareness that firms will have an incentive to go public when information asymmetries exist 
in order to gain large amounts of capital, firms will be forced to launch their IPO during low 
levels of information asymmetry. Alti (2005) stated that high price realizations for firms that 
go public early may be due to better reflection of investors’ private information, which 
triggers a larger number of subsequent IPOs than when low offer price realizations occur.   
Beside focusing on the internal aspects of IPO timing using the lifecycle approach, 
research in finance has also emphasized industry cycles or external cyclicality aspects in IPO 
timing. These timing decisions can be categorized as “windows of opportunity” or 
availability of market information. Research on windows of opportunity suggests that the 
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timing of IPOs can be subject to cyclicality in the industry, and that IPOs are timed to exploit 
these peaks in order to gain favorable financing terms (Shiller, 1990; Rittter, 1991; Loughran, 
Ritter, and Rydqvist, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Thus, when the stock market enters a 
cycle of overall high valuations, firms will be willing to launch their IPO in order to reap the 
benefits quickly (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998).  
2.4.2  Continuous Time Flow  
Literature on IPOs as a continuous time flow assumes that launching IPOs early 
allows firms to generate the capital needed to support growth sooner and allows venture 
capitalists to obtain their returns on investments earlier (Freeman, 1999). This is because 
early IPO launches provide firms with resources for early growth and provide investors and 
owners with higher real returns on investments. This has been the basis for the only two 
empirical studies on the timing of IPOs in the field of entrepreneurship and strategy (Stuart et 
al., 1999; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001), which were reviewed in the previous section.  
2.4.3  Punctuated Time Flow  
 Researchers in the field of entrepreneurship have also viewed firm transformations 
with a punctuated view of time flow. This view depicts firms as evolving through long 
periods of stability, with sudden discontinuous shocks that provide incentives to transform 
(Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). Although firms can undergo transformation during any 
period as a result of changes in external conditions, Romanelli and Tushman (1994) argue 
that small changes that a firm faces will not accumulate incrementally as large 
transformations. In addition, Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992) assert that firms that 
make sudden changes in response to sudden shocks in the environment obtain higher long-
term performance than firms that did not transform, or were transformed during the period 
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without any sudden shocks in the environment. However, most of the research in this area 
has focused on technology change and its impact on firm transformation (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). In the context of product markets, 
according to Kogut (1991), sudden changes in market demand can induce firms to take 
advantage of the opportunities. However, whether sudden changes in the market support 
firms’ needs for an IPO has not been studied. 
2.5  Uncertainty 
While research on IPOs under a competitive strategy perspective has been based on 
the objective state of the external environment, how uncertain conditions of the environment 
affect the timing of the IPO has been ignored. A review of uncertainty is important because 
decision making under uncertain conditions is essential to competitive strategy. In this 
section, I summarize the literature on uncertainty that will form the basis for the theoretical 
development on IPO timings in the subsequent chapters.  
Many definitions of uncertainty have been used in the strategy literature. In general, 
uncertainty occurs when “the probabilities of alternative outcomes cannot be determined by a 
priori reasoning or statistical inference” (Casson, 1982:371). This definition aligns with that 
of other researchers who define uncertainty as the inability to predict the likelihood of future 
events or outcomes (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Duncan, 1972). It is important to 
distinguish the definition of uncertainty from the definition of risk or volatility: if events or 
outcomes change in predictable ways, substantial risk or volatility may exist, but there may 
be little uncertainty (Miles and Snow, 1978). The distinction is important because it is the 
presence of uncertainty, not risk, that provides entrepreneurial opportunities (Jones and 
Butler, 1992). This follows financial logic that the reward for risk is predetermined according 
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to the degree of risk that an individual or firm undertakes, whereas entrepreneurial profits are 
“the above normal returns upon acting upon unique uncertainties or opportunities for which 
objective probabilities cannot be calculated” (Jones and Butler, 1992). 
Uncertainty in decision making is induced when managers do not understand how the 
components of the environment may be changing (Milliken, 1987). Under uncertainty, the 
environment is the source of information, which is filtered by managerial perceptions 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). Information in the market that may affect 
IPO timing includes the product market and the stock market. Although no research 
explicitly links the product market with the stock market in the IPO decision, some research 
does suggest that the linkage may exist. According to the entrepreneurship literature, when 
product market demands increase, entrepreneurs will respond by increasing their firm 
capacity (Bergh, 1998). Similarly, when the trends in the financial markets are favorable, 
entrepreneurs will respond by taking advantage of the favorable conditions in order to 
acquire higher levels of slack resources. As IPOs support capacity increase as well as 
resource acquisition, entrepreneurial firms are likely to incorporate the conditions in the 
product market into their IPO decisions. However, the linkage has not been tested directly. 
2.5.1  Product Demand Uncertainty 
Product demand uncertainty is generated by rapid shifts in consumer preferences and 
needs resulting in an inability to predict or gauge future demand for products (Jones, 
Hesterly, and Burgatti, 1997). The level of product demand provides information on the 
potential sales and profit available to a firm; thus it provides a direct indication of the degree 
to which a firm may need to prepare its resources and production capacity to meet the 
anticipated demand or to gain the potential share. Beside a shift in consumer preferences and 
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needs, product demand uncertainty is also generated by rapid changes in knowledge and 
technology, which may result in a change in the life cycle of the product, requiring changes 
in resources, production capability, and product process (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). 
Product demand uncertainty has been used as a source of uncertainty in various strategy 
literature. For example, Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) found that product demand 
uncertainty makes vertical integration risky owing to potential obsolescence. Mariotti and 
Cainarca (1986) found that under conditions of product demand uncertainty, firms 
disaggregate into autonomous units and outsource in order to develop their ability to respond 
to a wide range of contingencies. In the context of IPOs, firms base their resource 
requirement and production expansion needs on the level of product demands (Bergh, 1998). 
As discussed in the previous sections, product decisions and financial decisions are not made 
separately (Povel and Raith, 2004), and IPOs support firms’ expansion needs and growth. 
Under this assumption, the level of uncertainty in product market demands is likely to 
influence the timing of IPOs. However, the linkage between product demand uncertainty and 
IPO decision has not been empirically tested.  
2.5.2  Stock Return Uncertainty  
Stock return uncertainty is generated by rapid shifts in the value of firms’ stocks. The 
value of a firm’s stock is the sum of the discounted value of future cash flows expected to be 
generated from assets in place and the net present value of expected cash flows from 
investment opportunities that are expected to be generated by the firm in the future (Brealey 
and Myers, 1988). The value of the firm changes as its performance changes and as 
investors’ expectations about the cash returns from the firm’s current and future assets 
change. Information that may influence firms’ assets include country-level information (e.g., 
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political factors), industry-level information (e.g., market entry opportunities, licensing 
opportunities, and changes in resources and technology), and firm-specific information (e.g., 
firm resources and capabilities). Thus the overall value of the stock returns within the same 
industry provides a general indication of the degree investors may be willing to provide 
financial resources to firms—an important indicator to private firms in which their firm value 
may not be inferred from their stock prices. Such supply of financial resources will allow 
firms to prepare their resources and production capability to manage their latent growth 
potential. Stock return uncertainty has been used as a source of uncertainty in various 
strategy literature. For example, Gulati and Higgins (2003) and Stuart et al. (1999) used stock 
market indexes and returns as a measure of industry uncertainty for biotechnology firms.  
2.6  Capital Funding 
 Firms that have high growth aspirations require funding to support their development 
prior to an IPO. The following sections will briefly describe the types of funding most 
common to pre-IPO firms. 
2.6.1  Venture Capital 
The most common source of funding among high growth firms is through venture 
capital, which is involved in close to half of all IPOs in the United States (Jain and Kini, 
2000). Venture capitalists not only provide necessary funding to firms, but also provide firms 
with business advisory support. Venture capitalists support entrepreneurs in their IPO 
launches by providing access to large amounts of capital at reduced costs (MacMillan, 
Kulow, and Khoylian, 1989; Sahlman, 1990). Venture capitalists are also able to guide 
entrepreneurs, who often have limited knowledge and managerial skills in a particular 
industry, by leveraging their knowledge gained in their support of other firms in their 
 32
portfolio (e.g., Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Rock, 1987; Timmons, 1994; Jain and Kini, 2000). 
Such support helps entrepreneurial firms create value by coordinating when firms should 
launch their IPO (Schultz, 2000). The level of support from the venture capitalists also varies 
according to the degree of involvement, which ranges from limited involvement to direct 
involvement, sometimes including voting rights on key decisions (MacMillan et al., 1989; 
Zider, 1998).  
Despite the support that venture capitalists provide to entrepreneurial firms, empirical 
results on the performance of venture capital-backed firms as a result of association with 
venture capitalists has been varied. One group found that the presence of venture capitalists 
had a significant effect on the performance of firms during the IPO launch and performance 
after it; another group found no significant effects during the launch or after. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990) 
found that venture capital firms’ certification role mitigates information asymmetries and 
brings about lower levels of underpricing during the IPO launch. In addition, venture 
capitalists’ active involvement that influences the actions of managers on strategic resource 
decisions also brings about higher long-run post-IPO performance (Brav and Gompers, 1997) 
and higher survival rates (Jain and Kini, 2000). Other researchers found no effects from the 
presence of venture capitalists, and explained this with several theories. Amit, Glosten, and 
Muller (1990) suggested their lack of results may be because strong entrepreneurial firms 
may be able to launch an IPO without venture capitalists’ support; thus venture capitalists 
only attract weaker firms that are forced to sell their equity interests. Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1994) suggested that internal agency issues may mitigate any long-term post IPO benefits 
that the firm could receive. This is because as venture capitalists become part of the firm, 
 33
they may perpetuate an over-investment problem and use other people’s money to invest in 
value destroying projects.  
As the potential role and influence of venture capitalists on venture capital-backed 
firms’ behavior and resulting performance is still unclear, this issue deserves further 
attention. 
2.6.2  Other Capital Sources 
Two other sources of funding are mezzanine financing and issuance of preference 
shares. Mezzanine financing is typically used when firms have reached their bank borrowing 
limits, but still want large sums of capital without having to issue equity. Unlike venture 
capitalists, investors who provide mezzanine financing do not provide business advice or 
require firms to provide them with voting rights. Other sources of funding include issuance 
of preference shares. Preference shares provide investors with a fixed rate of dividends, but 
no voting rights. 
2.7  Summary 
In this chapter I reviewed the literature relevant to IPO decisions and timing in all 
three fields—entrepreneurship, strategy, and finance. In the next chapter I address the gaps 







CHAPTER 3: CRITICAL REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides a critical review of the literature relevant to IPO decisions 
and timing by discussing the inconsistencies within and among three fields of research 
(entrepreneurship, finance, and strategy) pertaining to the IPO timing decisions that were 
reviewed in the previous chapter. The chapter starts with a discussion of the IPO 
motivations and their conflicting implications for a firm’s IPO timing decision. The chapter 
then addresses the gaps in the literature related to the levels of analysis in entrepreneurship 
and strategy research with respect to firms’ response to uncertainty. Lastly, the review 
addresses the strategic implications of IPO timing and proposes theories that may address 
these gaps and conflicts. 
3.1 Entrepreneurship Research: Later IPO Timings 
The chapter 2 review of IPOs in the entrepreneurship literature shows that IPOs 
have mainly been studied from the perspective of the lifecycle and the perspective of 
ownership and control (Bhide, 2000). Both perspectives assume that an IPO takes place 
sometime during the firm’s high growth stage or the final stage of the firm’s early 
development. However, under these two perspectives, the specific timing of the IPO launch 
is not directly addressed, and the conditions that lead to an IPO choice are somewhat 
inconsistent. The life cycle approach assumes that an IPO will occur during the later stages 
of a firm’s early development and that firms that launch an IPO will either have reached 
their high growth phase or have matured and are ready for an IPO launch. The assumption 
ignores two issues: the external market conditions surrounding the firm and the fact that 
 
firms may or may not actively seek an IPO. These two issues that have been ignored could 
help to explain when and why firms launch IPOs.  
First, by leaving out the effects of the external market conditions surrounding the 
firm, the lifecycle approach does not address how the value of launching an IPO may 
fluctuate. The external conditions surrounding the firm are important in IPO launches 
because these conditions may determine the success of an IPO—both during the IPO 
launch and the firm’s performance after. The external market conditions that may make an 
IPO successful may not necessarily occur during a firm’s high growth phase: they may 
occur during the early stages of a firm’s development, or may not occur during the high 
growth phase at all. Thus, the life cycle perspective does not address incidences in which 
some firms have launched their IPOs prior to their high growth phase, nor does it explain 
why firms may choose not to launch an IPO.  
Second, by leaving out the motivations (other than harvesting) for an IPO launch, 
the life cycle approach assumes that managers have little role in determining the direction 
and outcome of the firm. However, even if the IPO launch is motivated purely by 
harvesting reasons, the life cycle approach still does not explain why some firms harvest 
early, some late, and some not at all. That the lifecycle approach does not explain these 
discrepancies suggests that IPO launches could also be driven by other motives that may 
explain differences in firms’ IPO timing.  
Therefore, consideration of other potential IPO motives in conjunction with 
examining the external market conditions may help explain discrepancies in IPO timings 
among firms. This is in accordance with many recent strategy and entrepreneurship 
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researchers who have criticized the life cycle approach as insufficient to explain firm 
development (Whetten, 1987; Ireland, Hitt, Camp, and Sexton, 2001). 
The perspective of ownership and control assumes that firms will defer their IPOs 
as long as possible. This is based on the assumption that many entrepreneurs have a 
psychological commitment to the firm they have built and are identified with it (Bhide, 
2000). Thus, the perspective of ownership and control assumes that entrepreneurs’ 
preference would be to not launch an IPO or defer it as long as possible. However, this 
assumption ignores the fact that IPOs may provide firms with competitive advantages, and 
that the entrepreneurs’ desire to succeed through gaining advantages over the competition 
may mitigate or override any advantages or psychological benefits from prolonged 
retention of the firm. In the previous chapter, I reviewed how IPOs can provide firms with 
resources that owners may not have such as economies of scale, marketing and publicity, 
and quality labor. These resources are essential to entrepreneurs, particularly as research 
has shown that many entrepreneurs have the qualities to start a firm but lack the skills to 
manage it to grow and become a large corporation (Bhide, 2000).  
While there have been few direct tests of whether entrepreneurs actively seek 
resources to support their firms’ competitiveness, large corporations do respond to changes 
in their environment and competition (Chen, 1996; Porter, 1985). Research has also shown 
that entrepreneurs do have open-minded qualities and may be willing to revise their mental 
models and forecasts when faced with uncertainty (Bhide, 2000). Therefore, changes in the 
environment and threats from competition may trigger entrepreneurs to reconsider their 
stance on maintaining ownership and control. Thus, opportunities related to changes in the 
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external environment and threats from competition are factors that may help explain IPO 
decisions and deserve testing. 
In summary, the entrepreneurship literature suggests that IPO launches are likely to 
be deferred to as long as possible. However, this perspective does not incorporate the 
change in the value of the IPO that could occur due to changes in market conditions. Nor 
does it explore how entrepreneurs may react when competition is present. Understanding 
how entrepreneurs behave in the presence of opportunities in the external environment and 
of competition may provide arguments counter to the current assumption.  
3.2 Finance Research: Early IPO Timings 
As indicated by the review of IPOs in the finance literature in the previous chapter, 
the literature mainly focuses on IPOs as a wealth creation process (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998). Wealth creation is defined as (1) the ability to 
generate wealth through capital raised, and (2) the ability to generate firm growth through 
sales and profits that significantly exceed competitors' growth (Ireland, Hitt, Camp, and 
Sexton, 2001). Thus the wealth creation process is the act of raising capital and achieving 
sales and profitability. Research in finance has mainly focused on the investors’ perspective 
and, as a result, has emphasized the process of raising capital. However, the process of 
achieving sales has more resonance with entrepreneurs, who may aspire long-term growth 
of their firm. Thus, the literature ignores that fact that investors and firm owners may place 
different emphasis on, and have different opportunity costs, in their wealth creation. These 
different values and opportunity costs may influence decisions and their time horizons in 
decision making.  
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Investors will try to recover their investments as early as possible, in order to 
achieve real returns on investments and reinvest their funding (e.g., Subrahmanyam and 
Titman, 1999). However, owners that seek firm growth through sales are likely to place 
more emphasis on taking advantage of opportunities in the market and building 
competencies for their firm. The ability to achieve sales growth depends not on the capital 
market, but on the conditions in the product market. Similarly, the need to build 
competencies depends not on the capital markets, but on the level of competition in the 
product market. Thus, owners who seek growth through sales are likely to have different 
time horizons in their IPO decisions than those of investors. Integrating the product market 
conditions and competition into the study of IPOs will help complete our understanding of 
IPOs as a wealth creation process. 
In summary, the finance literature suggests that early timing of IPOs is preferred. 
However, the literature takes the perspective of wealth creation for investors, and gives 
little attention to the firm’s perspective of wealth creation for the firm. The ability of firms 
to gain wealth may also depend on the conditions and the level of competition in the 
product market. Including this latter perspective into studies on IPOs is essential to our 
understanding of entrepreneurs’ choice and timing of IPO.  
3.3 Strategy Research: Unclear on IPO Timings 
Research on strategy in general focuses on managing growth and building 
competitive advantage. The review of IPOs in the previous chapter shows that IPOs can 
provide firms with growth prospects and competitive advantages. However there has been 
little research into strategy that directly addresses of the choice of an IPO and the resultant 
launch timing. Most of the research on IPOs that provides suggestions on IPO launch 
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timing has followed the finance literature that favors an early launch (i.e., Stuart, Hoang, 
and Hybels, 1999). Other research on IPO strategy has focused on attaining high market 
valuations or minimizing underpricing (e.g., Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Cyr, Johnson, and 
Welbourne, 2000). Again, such research takes the perspective of wealth creation for 
investors in which high market valuations or low levels of underpricing is favorable. 
However, these assumptions do not align with general research in strategy because, 
as described in the previous section, cashing out or attaining high valuation is not the same 
as gaining or building competitive advantage for a firm. This is evident because many 
successful IPO launches experience long-term underperformance (Fischer and Pollock, 
2004; Jain and Kini, 2000). As building a competitive advantage depends on the unique 
resources that a firm possesses or acquires and decision making under uncertainty, it is 
important that these two factors are integrated into the studies of IPO as a competitive 
strategy. 
The issue of resource acquisition and decision making under uncertainty is likely to 
affect the timing of firms’ IPO launch, but the direction can bring about tensions in 
predicting the timing of an IPO. First, the need for resources is likely to support early IPO 
timing, whereas the effect of uncertainty on decision making is unclear. As discussed 
earlier, IPOs can support firms with economies of scale in production, reputation and 
legitimacy, network effects, and development of organizational capabilities (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988). With the presence of competition, early gaining of resources is likely 
to be advantageous as firms will be able to preempt their rivals (e.g., Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988; Chen, 1996). Research has shown that uncertainties can both induce 
action (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1996) and induce firms to defer action (McDonald and Siegel, 
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1996). Therefore, whether uncertainty will induce entrepreneurial firms to launch IPOs or 
inhibit their IPO launch is unclear and deserves further research.  
In summary, the strategy literature has predominantly taken the perspective of the 
finance literature, which researches IPOs from the perspective of the investor; key aspects 
of competitive strategy—resource acquisition and decisions under uncertainty—have been 
ignored. How firms make decisions regarding their IPOs when considering resource 
acquisition through an IPO under uncertainty is unclear. 
3.4 The Behavior and Decision Making Process Under Uncertainty 
3.4.1 Behavior Under Uncertainty: Unclear 
As discussed in the previous section, uncertainty may play an important role in 
determining the timing of IPOs. The issue of uncertainty has been studied extensively in 
the field of strategy and entrepreneurship, but the studies have been inconclusive with 
respect to the effects on firm behavior, which has remained an open issue in strategy 
research (Miner and Raju, 2004). Much of the tensions surrounding uncertainty result from 
whether firms act in accordance with the theory of entrepreneurial action or real options 
reasoning. In this research, I analyze how firms make their IPO timing decisions based on 
what the theories of entrepreneurial action or real options reasoning would predict. 
According to the entrepreneurial action approach, uncertainty increases the range of 
opportunities available and entrepreneurs who are able to recognize these opportunities will 
benefit from taking action under uncertainty (Schumpeter, 1934; Shane and Venkataraman, 
2000). According to this approach, when uncertainty is high, firms will likely launch an 
IPO in order to gain funding to support the available opportunities in the market. 
Conversely, from a real options reasoning approach, the inability to understand the 
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appropriate response under uncertainty may be managed through deferral (McDonald and 
Siegel, 1986; Bowman and Hurry, 1993), and firms will likely defer their IPO in order to 
wait and gain a better understanding of the market opportunities. Thus, these two theories 
predict opposite outcomes from uncertainty with respect to an IPO launch.  
There are indications that these differences may lie in the level of analysis: research 
under entrepreneurial action has mostly been tested on small firms, whereas research using 
real options reasoning has mostly been tested on large established firms. Thus, it is 
important to examine how entrepreneurial firms at different levels of familiarity of the 
environment respond to uncertainty. That both small firms and large established ones are 
determining their IPO launch timing provides a unique circumstance that may shed light on 
the conditions that lead to the different outcomes pertaining to uncertainty. 
Beside the potential tensions that derive from uncertain conditions in the market, 
according to the behavior theory, actions mainly occur when triggered or induced by 
sudden unexpected shocks in the environment (Kogut, 1991; Lant and Mezias, 1992). As 
sudden shocks and uncertainty are not mutually exclusive, entrepreneurs may respond to 
uncertainty, to rapid shifts, or to both, and this deserves further attention. 
3.4.2 Response to Different Sources of Uncertainty: Unclear 
How entrepreneurs respond to different sources of uncertainty in their IPO launch is 
unclear. Chapter 2 established the importance of and relationship between product and 
stock markets. However, whether there is a direct linkage between the product market and 
firms’ decisions on IPO timing has yet to be tested. This raises the question, if such linkage 
exists, whether firms respond to uncertainty in the product market and stock market in a 
similar fashion.  
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The product market and financial market are not entirely correlated. This is because 
the changes in the product market as a result of consumer preferences, production 
capability, or manufacturing knowledge may not move in the same direction as the changes 
in the stock market as a result of political factors, technology factors, or firm-specific 
advantages. When the changes in the product and stock markets are not in the same 
direction, tensions in decision making may occur. Some literature suggests that tensions 
may exist even if these markets move in the same direction. First, entrepreneurs may have 
different decision making mechanisms when faced with different sources of uncertainty 
(Busenitz and Barney, 1994). In the stock market, a wealth of information is available to 
decision makers; thus, firm decisions are likely to be made based on rationality. However, 
in the product market, where information may not be widely available, firm decisions are 
likely to be based on bounded rationality. These different decision making heuristics in 
response to the different sources of uncertainty may lead to different firm decisions (Dess 
and Beard, 1984). Thus, whether differences in firms’ responses to uncertainty in the 
financial market and product market, especially at the entrepreneurial level, lead to 
different responses in the pursuit of growth through an IPO deserves examination.  
Second, in addition to rationality, the level of familiarity with the conditions in the 
market may also affect how firms respond to uncertainty. According to Barringer and 
Bluedorn (1999), managers who are familiar with the external environment will be better 
able to detect information that may be pertinent to reducing the overall uncertainties that 
they face, resulting in the ability to make correct decisions (Jackson and Dutton, 1988; 
Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999). However, firm owners and their venture capitalists, who 
may have voting rights in the IPO decision, likely have different degrees of familiarity with 
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each source of uncertainty. Therefore it is important to understand how the different 
sources of uncertainty may affect the joint decision making about the IPO. 
3.5 The Role of Competition: Unclear 
The issue of how firms achieve growth and competitive positioning has been a 
central concern of strategy implementation (e.g., Chandler, 1962; Hamel and Prahalad, 
1994). As IPOs can have competitive implications for a firm (as per section 2.3.3), research 
on how firms react or respond to competitive threats in their IPO decision deserves 
attention. Surprisingly, research on IPOs in strategy or entrepreneurship has not addressed 
this issue directly, and research in finance on this issue has been inconclusive. Some 
researchers have suggested that competition may induce firms to take preemptive moves in 
acquiring resources (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Chen, 1996); other researchers, 
especially from the finance literature, have suggested that the presence of competition may 
induce firms to refrain from launching IPOs (Draho, 2004). Neither view has been tested 
and the differences may lie in the how competition in the product market and in the stock 
market has been studied in the different fields. 
Competition in the product market has often been studied in the context of using 
resources to exploit opportunities in order to gain a sustainable advantage over prolonged 
periods. In comparison, competition in the stock market has often been studied in the 
context of IPO valuation during the IPO launch period. Although there may be some 
differences in the contexts of competition in the product market and in the stock market (as 
discussed in the previous section) product market and stock market decisions are not 
independent and a conceptual integration in these two areas is merited. 
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In integrating these two concepts, the notion of blind spots and competitive 
response may provide a link. Blind spots are defined as judgment mistakes due to “the 
inability to sufficiently consider the decisions of competitive others” (Zajac and Bazerman, 
1991). Competitive responses are how firms respond to potential competition. The 
literature has shown that, under high levels of competition, firms may either take action to 
defer the ability of others to act, or they may prefer to not take action in order to avoid 
triggering potential competitive responses. In the product market, blind spots may allow 
firms to act to deter competitors from developing competitive advantages. However, given 
the transparent nature of the IPO process, blind spots may cease to exist. Whether firms 
take action to deter or avoid rivals in their IPO process needs to be determined. These 
differences in the nature of the product market and stock market, and how they may 
integrate and lead to an IPO decision, have been ignored. 
3.6 Summary 
The literature regarding the timing of IPO launches provides several conflicting 
opinions. One conflict is from the stand point of how firms react when faced with 
uncertainty (entrepreneurial action vs. real options reasoning); another is whether firms 
respond to different sources of uncertainty and competition differently (product market vs. 
stock market); and a third is whether firms act in accordance with continuous or punctuated 
models of time. 
Several of the conflicts arise from using different theories to explain IPOs from 
different standpoints (investors’ or owners’) and different motivations (cash-out or firm 
growth). This has resulted in inconsistent implications for IPO timing. The strategy 
literature indicates that little research has been done that directly addresses the choice of 
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IPO and the resultant IPO timing. Some theories may provide insights to this question—but 
with opposite predictions for outcomes. The literature on the entrepreneurial action 
approach states that uncertain market conditions provide firms with entrepreneurial 
opportunities and may influence an early IPO timing. These opportunities may arise from 
changes in both the product market and stock market—and the multidimensional influence 
of such factors have previously been ignored. Conversely, the literature on real options 
reasoning indicates that firms may not know the appropriate response options to such 
changes and may choose to defer an IPO. Such differences may hinge on the joint decision-
making mechanism of the entrepreneurs and their venture capitalists, as well as the 
competitive dynamics in the market. Thus, integrating the entrepreneurial action approach 
and real options reasoning, and the competitive dynamics of the firms under such 
conditions, may help us understand how firms determine their IPO timing when seeking 
long-term growth. In addition, the strategy literature indicates that firms typically take 
action based on a continuous time flow; firm actions are based not on cycles or information 
in the past, but on current or anticipated events. Some entrepreneurship literature indicates 
that firms’ actions are characterized by periods of market efficiency and are punctuated by 
periods of upheaval discontinuous shocks. Understanding how shocks impact IPO 
decisions will increase our understandings of how these decisions are made. 
In the next chapter, I develop testable hypotheses related to the gaps and conflicts 
mentioned above, to explain how and when entrepreneurs choose to launch their IPO based 






CHAPTER 4: THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This chapter builds on the gaps and concepts identified in the previous chapter and 
develops hypotheses to explain how strategic considerations influence firms’ IPO timing. 
The hypotheses proposed in this chapter intend to improve our understanding of IPOs by 
proposing and testing the relationship between product market and stock market 
uncertainty and the likelihood of IPOs.  
 In section 4.1, I propose hypotheses based on the theory of entrepreneurial action, 
and in section 4.2, I propose competing hypotheses based on the theory of real options 
reasoning. I then reconcile these two contrasting set of hypotheses in section 4.3, based on 
the involvement of the venture capitalist in the decision making. Next, in section 4.4, I 
include competitive factors in the relationship, and in section 4.5, the potential interaction 
effects between uncertainty and competition. In section 4.6, I test the IPO timing based on 
a punctuated time flow. And lastly, in section 4.7, I summarize the hypotheses. 
4.1   Uncertainty and IPO Timing: A Theory of Entrepreneurial Action 
The presence of uncertainty in the external market causes fragmentation of 
information resulting in market disequilibrium (Hayek, 1937). Such disequilibrium can 
create tensions about how firms manage uncertainty. This section will discuss how 
uncertainty influences the higher likelihood of IPO based on the theory of entrepreneurial 
action. The next section will discuss how uncertainty may act as a deterrent, decreasing the 
likelihood of IPO, based on the theory of real options reasoning.  
 
The theory of entrepreneurial action is based on taking advantage of the uncertainty 
in the general environment in order to create firm wealth (e.g., Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 
2007; Casson, 1982). According to the theory of entrepreneurial action, uncertainty creates 
asymmetries of information within the market, which will give rise to disequilibrium in the 
market. Market disequilibrium will provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to create wealth 
for the firm (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Busenitz and Barney, 1997). Uncertainty is a 
necessary condition for entrepreneurial opportunities because if market conditions were 
certain, information would be equally available to all firms and any rents available would 
be driven to zero (Casson, 1982). Thus, entrepreneurs who take action when opportunities 
arise from uncertainty will be able to support their firm’s growth.  
When entrepreneurs act under uncertain conditions in the general environment, 
downside risks may also exist. However, entrepreneurs are likely to take action without 
regard to the potential downside because of the nature of their ability to recognize 
opportunities and their high tolerance for ambiguity or low aversion to uncertainty. 
Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) note that entrepreneurs have unique scanning abilities that 
provide them with skills in detecting information or opportunities that may be pertinent to 
their firms. And Bhide (2000) noted that entrepreneurs have a high tolerance for ambiguity 
in making decisions. This quality derives from entrepreneurs’ high self-confidence and the 
low weight they place on the social and psychological consequences of failure. These two 
traits support firms acting in accordance with the theory of entrepreneurial action, which 
holds that the presence of uncertainty will likely induce firms to take action to create 
wealth. 
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The linkage between uncertainty and taking action to acquire the opportunities 
inherent in the general environment may extend to IPO launches as well because (1) IPOs 
provide firms with resources to support the opportunities that may derive from uncertainty 
in the general environment, and (2) high levels of uncertainty signal entrepreneurs that they 
may be able to extend their resource base through an IPO.  
First, small firms have limited resources to develop their growth. As new demands 
and opportunities develop as a result of uncertainty, firms may require large increases in 
economies of scale in production, awareness and legitimacy, and, most importantly, newer 
sources of supply or raw materials (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Ripsas, 1998; 
Schumpeter, 1934). Many of these requirements may exceed a firm’s current capacity and 
resource base. Also, many small firms are not likely to have a track record of large sales, 
which limits their borrowing capabilities. Therefore, when the degree of uncertainty 
becomes very large, firms will need to launch an IPO to gain the resources to support their 
growth needs. 
Second, uncertainty may induce firms to carefully assess the growth opportunities 
prevalent in the market and the level of competencies that they posses in order to take 
advantage of these growth opportunities through an IPO. This is because firms may not 
have recognized their capabilities or their need to develop capabilities (Bowman and Hurry, 
1993). However, at high levels of uncertainty, the possible range of product demands and 
prices will increase, which in turn will enhance the visibility of growth opportunities. 
Therefore, as the level of uncertainty increases, firms may increase their estimates of their 
potential growth opportunities and extend their reach to gain them through an IPO. This is 
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because entrepreneurs will determine the potential course of action needed to exploit the 
growth opportunities (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). 
The timing of a firm’s acquisition of resources must also coincide with the 
entrepreneurial opportunities as a result of high levels of uncertainty in the general 
environment. When slack resources are acquired and deployed is important because if firms 
wait too long to act or wait for the level of uncertainty in the general environment to settle, 
the level of growth opportunities in the market may decline, resulting in missed 
opportunities or decreased chances of success. Uncertainty that enhances opportunity can 
originate from both the product market and the stock market.  
4.1.1 Product Market Uncertainty 
The level of uncertainty in product demand provides a direct indication of the 
entrepreneurial opportunities that can be acquired through an IPO launch. This is because 
the level of product demand impacts the price of products, which largely determines the 
profit a firm may gain. The level of product demand also provides information on how 
increased demands or new market opportunities can be served, how production processes 
can be improved, and/or how resources can be allocated. Under conditions of uncertainty in 
product demand, firms that exploit entrepreneurial opportunities will be able to achieve 
further growth. However, support of such entrepreneurial opportunities requires critical 
resources such as funding, human resources, knowledge, and legitimacy (e.g., Ritter and 
Welch, 2002)—which an IPO launch can provide to young entrepreneurial firms. In 
addition, in the process of a launch, IPOs can also attract valuable customers and partners 
(Draho, 2004) and increase publicity (Ravasi and Marchisio, 2003; Rydqvist and Hogholm, 
1995)—all necessary to reinforce the success of entrepreneurial actions. Therefore, the 
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higher the uncertainty in product demand, as signaled by patterns or variances in that 
demand, the higher the likelihood that firms will launch their IPO. Thus,  
HYPOTHESIS 1A: High uncertainty in product demand will increase the likelihood of 
IPO launch. 
4.1.2 Stock Market Uncertainty 
The level of uncertainty in stock returns also provides an indication of the 
entrepreneurial opportunities that can be acquired through an IPO launch. This is because 
the level of stock returns provides an indication of the political climate, resources, 
knowledge and technological advances, as well as any other changes that may affect the 
industry. For example, new government policies on import tariffs or industrial zoning could 
change a firm’s ability to achieve high revenues or expand production, resulting in changed 
growth opportunities, and thereby change investors’ sentiment and affect the level of stock 
returns. These factors, under uncertain conditions, provide entrepreneurial opportunities 
that may differ from those generated by uncertainty in product demands. In addition, the 
stock market may be a more efficient indicator of the available entrepreneurial 
opportunities than the product market, as the stock market enhances transparency and 
efficient dissemination of information. For new markets, some information may be 
proprietary and not evident through the product market. Given these differences, the stock 
market may provide a better indicator of entrepreneurial opportunities than the product 
market. Therefore, the higher the uncertainty in stock returns, as signaled by patterns or 
variances in the stock return, the higher the likelihood that firms will launch their IPO. 
Thus,  
HYPOTHESIS 1B: High uncertainty in stock market return will increase the 
likelihood of IPO launch. 
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4.2   Uncertainty and IPO Timing: A Theory of Real Options Reasoning 
While in the previous section, I explained that firms will act in accordance with the 
theory of entrepreneurial action and have a higher likelihood of IPO launch when 
uncertainty increases, in this section I develop arguments that firms will act in accordance 
with the theory of real options reasoning and have a lower likelihood of IPO launch when 
uncertainty increases. The concept of real options reasoning is an extension of financial 
option theory, which can be broadly defined as “the right, but not the obligation to take an 
action in the future” (Amran and Kulatilika, 1999). In using the theory of real options 
reasoning to understand why firms would have a lower likelihood of IPO, I am defining a 
firm as an entity that can launch an IPO at any time, but holds the option to defer such 
launch. The theory of real options reasoning helps to explain an asymmetrical performance 
distribution that is skewed toward the upside (McGrath, Ferrier, and Mendelow, 2004). 
Value is achieved when managers pursue opportunities that allow them to enhance their 
upside potential and contain downside loss. By deferring major action while maintaining 
the right to pursue action subsequently, firms can pursue high variance outcomes at a later 
time (McGrath, 1999; McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
As described in the previous section, uncertainty in the external market creates 
entrepreneurial opportunities. However, at the same time, there exists a potential loss 
because firms may misinterpret the market and overinvest, resulting in destruction of value. 
Undertaking major action or investments under a high level of uncertainty could lead to 
costly mistakes. These mistakes may be due to the firm’s inability to assess the 
environment, to assess the impact of the environment on the firm, or to determine the 
appropriate responses to take. Thus, the higher the level of uncertainty, the higher the value 
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of deferring the action due to the potential availability later of better information about the 
environment, the cause-effect of the environment, and/or the appropriate response option 
that would allow the firm to avoid costly mistakes (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Majd and 
Pindyck, 1987).  
Conversely, as the level of uncertainty decreases, the value of deferring an action 
decreases, and firms stands to gain from taking action with better-informed decisions 
(Bowman and Hurry, 1993). In the context of IPO timing, firms can defer their IPO until 
uncertainty in the market subsides. If uncertainty in the market conditions is high or market 
conditions remain unfavorable, the firm can protect itself against downside losses or costly 
mistakes by continuing to defer its IPO.  
4.2.1 Product Market Uncertainty 
Under conditions of high uncertainty in the product market, firms may have 
difficulty projecting their potential sales and profit (Bergh, 1998). The inability to assess 
product demand may lead to the inability to accurately determine the pricing and the 
required resources for production planning. Without the ability to predict these factors, 
firms will find it difficult to determine the production needs, staffing, and marketing of 
their products. Launching an IPO under highly uncertain demand conditions in order to 
acquire resources and capabilities to support production may incur opportunity costs for 
huge investments in production activities (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; Folta and O’Brien, 
2004).  
Although firms may launch an IPO during high levels of uncertainty in order to 
acquire capital first, then acquire the necessary resources for production when uncertainty 
subsides, research has found that premature acquisition does not confer advantages on a 
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firm. For resources to have value, they must be exploited by taking market actions (Grimm, 
Lee, and Smith, 2006). In addition, firms that acquire resources without considering 
demand may acquire the wrong resources (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998), resulting in 
inefficient resource deployment (Penrose, 1959) and suboptimal behavior (March and 
Simon, 1958). These combined effects may deter the growth of the firm (Wiseman and 
Bromiley, 1996)—which contravenes the objective for launching an IPO. Therefore, 
assuming there is a low level of understanding of the product market demand trends, future 
production requirements, and capital expenditure needs, delaying an IPO launch allows 
firms to learn more about their optimal course of action prior to obtaining the capital for 
resource acquisition (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001). In addition to minimizing 
opportunity costs, delaying an IPO launch also provides firms with the opportunity to free 
ride on the market development that early movers endure the costs and risks of promoting 
(Wernerfelt and Karnani, 1987; Liu, 2005). Therefore, the higher the uncertainty in product 
demand, as signaled by patterns or variances in the product demand, the lower the 
likelihood that firms will launch their IPO. Thus,  
HYPOTHESIS 2A: High uncertainty in product demand will decrease the likelihood 
of IPO launch. 
4.2.2 Stock Market Uncertainty 
Similar to product demand uncertainty, uncertainty in the stock market can lead to a 
lower likelihood of IPO launch. While firms’ actions under product uncertainty hinge upon 
firm productivity and opportunity costs within the product demand market, their actions 
under stock market uncertainty hinge on the effective acquisition of capital and the 
opportunity costs within the stock market. Highly volatile and unpredictable stock market 
returns may make it difficult for firms to accurately predict the costs required to purchase 
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capital from the market—which is one requirement of successful IPO performance. 
Launching an IPO without being able to predict the costs required to purchase capital may 
lead to higher marketing costs for the firm in going public and reduced growth 
opportunities. Under uncertain stock market conditions, firms must make significant 
investments in IPO market development in order to secure a successful launch (Benveniste, 
Busaba, and Wilhelm, 2002). This entails not only developing the market for themselves, 
but also in effect developing the stock market for the IPO launches of other firms during 
the same or a subsequent period. By having to pay higher costs to obtain capital, firms risk 
reducing the value of their potential growth opportunities in later periods (Jou, 2001). 
Therefore, under conditions of high uncertainty in the stock market, as signaled by patterns 
or variances in the stock return, delaying an IPO launch will allow firms to wait for free 
information, for the IPO market to be developed by other firms (Benveniste, Busaba, and 
Wilhelm, 2002), and/or for the opportunity to gain price run-ups (Ritter, 1991; Lerner, 
1994; Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm, 2002). Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 2B: High uncertainty in stock return will decrease the likelihood of 
IPO launch. 
4.2.3  Irreversibility and Uncertainty 
The irreversibility of a major action is a condition that necessarily provides value to 
deferral: the higher the degree of irreversibility of an action, the higher the value of 
deferring it (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). If actions are fully reversible, there is no need to 
defer them, as full recovery will be possible from any missteps taken. The costs of 
reversing action can be categorized into the cost of reversing tangible investments and the 
cost of reversing effects of intangible action. Research on real options has emphasized the 
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costs of the tangible investment component of irreversibility, such as capital expenses or 
other costs that can be subject to investment write-offs. However, when the investment is 
intangible, or is integrated within the firm, the costs can be substantial and may not be 
recoverable. Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that formal structures and rules developed by a 
firm can be binding on it. Thus, the irreversibility of a binding action will probably have a 
significant impact on the firm’s likelihood of taking action. 
Researchers have mainly ignored IPOs as an irreversible action for two reasons: the 
low costs of listing, and the ability of public firms to “go private.” First, the cost of being a 
public firm can be regarded as minimal when compared to the potential capital to be raised 
through an IPO. Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig (2005) estimated that the average direct 
cost of being a publicly traded firm is about 10% of firm profits as of the IPO launch date. 
Other researchers have found the cost of maintaining the current IPO status and the direct 
costs of delisting to be insignificant (Macey, O’Hara, and Pompila, 2003; Chen, Guo, and 
Lin, 2005). Given such minimal sunk costs, firms may not consider IPOs as irreversible 
action. Second, public firms have reverted their status to private. Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) found that the rate of IPO firms going private during the 1980s was about 7%, while 
Welch (1999) indicates that this rate during the 1980s to mid-1990s was approximately 
13%.  
While these studies imply that an IPO launch may, to a certain extent, be reversed, 
they ignore the intangible components that may affect the process of considering to launch 
an IPO. Evidence from the literature on public firms going private suggests that the process 
may not be so simple and that there may differences among firms in their ability to reverse 
their IPO decision. First, the decision to go private may not be available to all firms. The 
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anti-takeover statute prohibits management buyouts in certain industries. Also, firms may 
be in an industry that lacks the cash flows necessary for a management buyout (MBO) or 
leveraged buyout (LBO)—the processes that takes a firm private. Second, going private 
can be costly. Firms can only delist themselves from the stock exchange when they have a 
small shareholder base that no longer justifies the imposition of public company 
obligations and rules imposed by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In most 
cases, in order to go private, firms will have to repurchase their shares from their 
shareholders. This process may leave management prone to litigation if stockholders 
question the fairness of the price offered for their shares. Thus, management may have to 
pay a high price for repurchasing shares in order to avoid litigation by stockholders. 
Third, the process of going private can be time-consuming and distracting to 
management. The uncertainty of the outcome of going private may disconnect staff, 
customers, suppliers, and key stakeholders from the firm. Fourth, the notion of failure and 
regret may be intense for entrepreneurs that are highly vested and emotionally attached to 
their firms (Bhide, 2000; Markman, Baron, and Balkin, 2005). Therefore the higher the 
level of irreversibility, the greater the negative aspects of launching an IPO under 
uncertainty.  
The interaction between uncertainty and irreversibility, rather than the direct effect 
of irreversibility, is a necessary condition for deferral. This is because for a deferral to 
occur, uncertainty must exist; without uncertainty, there is no value in waiting. Also, 
without uncertainty, the level of irreversibility is likely to have little effect as the ex ante 
outcome is known to decision makers prior to taking action. Given that irreversibility is a 
concept unique to the option of deferral, irreversibility will likely further defer the course 
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of an IPO for firms that act in accordance with real options reasoning, but will have no 
effect for firms acting in accordance with entrepreneurial actions. Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 3A: High levels of irreversibility will increase the negative relationship 
between product demand uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO 
launch. 
HYPOTHESIS 3B: High levels of irreversibility will increase the negative relationship 
between stock return uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO launch. 
 
As irreversibility is a concept unique to deferral options, and will likely have no effect for 
firms undertaking the entrepreneurial approach, hypotheses were generated between 
uncertainty, irreversibility, and IPO only in this section and not in the previous one. 
4.3 Uncertainty and IPO Timing: The Effects of Venture Capitalist Involvement 
The sets of competing hypotheses presented in section 4.1 and 4.2 are based on two 
different theories: the theory of entrepreneurial action and the theory of real options 
reasoning. Such contrasting differences in the effect of uncertainty on the likelihood of IPO 
may be due to the degree of influence the venture capitalist has on the entrepreneur’s 
decisions. Firms with entrepreneurial orientation have been characterized and distinguished 
from more established firms by the former’s ability to make key decisions independently 
and pursue entrepreneurial opportunities accordingly (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). In the 
context of IPOs, the level of venture capitalists involvement in a firm may vary according 
to the level of their investment, ranging from very limited involvement to total control over 
key decisions in management, including the IPO timing (MacMillan et al., 1989; Zider, 
1998).  
 Firms that have less influence from venture capitalists in pursuing their 
entrepreneurial opportunities are likely to maintain an entrepreneurial action approach in 
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their IPO timing decisions—i.e., uncertain conditions will likely induce firms to launch 
their IPO earlier. This is because firms will be able to take full advantage of asymmetries of 
information in order to a gain advantage over their competition. 
 However, firms that have made decisions with the involvement of venture 
capitalists are likely to act in accordance with the theory of real options reasoning due to 
the inherent nature of rational decision making that venture capitalists are likely to possess. 
This is because venture capitalists are likely to have lower levels of entrepreneurial 
orientation and to have strong incentives to avoid mistakes in their investments. First, 
venture capitalists’ support for firms in making decisions is based on the venture 
capitalists’ experience with other entrepreneurs and they leverage their network of shared 
information (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsupens, 1990; Schultz, 2000). Over time, 
venture capitalists are able to learn from mistakes that young firms frequently make under 
uncertain conditions (Pagano and Röell, 1998). Such experience is likely to guide decision 
making under uncertainty toward a more rational approach. Second, venture capitalists who 
undertake an IPO launch under high levels of uncertainty may be prone to making costly 
mistakes that lower returns on investments and can tarnish the venture capitalists’ 
reputation. Therefore, firms with low levels of venture capitalist involvement are likely to 
take an entrepreneurial action approach in their IPO timing decisions, whereas firms with 
high levels of venture capitalist involvement are likely to act in accordance with a real 
options reasoning approach in their IPO timing decisions. Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Uncertainty will positively influence the likelihood of IPO when 
firms have a low level of venture capitalist involvement and 
negatively influence the likelihood of IPO when firms have a high 
level of venture capitalist involvement in their decision making. 
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4.4  The Direct Effects of Competition on the Likelihood IPO  
Beside competing predictions about the impact of uncertainty on the likelihood of 
IPOs, the potential strategic value from an IPO launch also hinges on the competitive 
dynamics in both the product market and the IPO offerings market. This is because firms 
incorporate the potential actions of their rivals into their own decisions. In the context of 
the product market, although firms in the same industry may offer different products, they 
are likely to have market commonalities and resource similarities: the resources, 
capabilities, and technology needed to develop their growth trajectory will be somewhat 
related. Chen (1996) noted that firms that have market commonalities and resource 
similarities will have a high awareness of their competitive environment. Thus, such firms 
will take into consideration their rivals’ actions and potential reactions in response to their 
own firm’s actions. Under low levels of competition, firms are highly likely to avoid 
rivalry because the competition may escalate to a point that no firms would be better off 
(Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 2006). Thus, actions may be delayed due to skepticism about 
what the firm could gain through market preemption. In the context of potential IPO 
launches, when rivalry is low in the product market, the prevalent opportunities can be 
easily observed and resources readily acquired by the competition (Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 
2006). Any attempts to launch an IPO to acquire resources and develop capabilities are 
likely to trigger rivals to follow suit, and any competitive advantage gained can be easily 
eroded.  
However, when there is a high level of competition in the product market, rivals 
will likely react to tactics in order to defend their critical resource base and their market 
position (Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 2006). When there is strong competition, firms that do 
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not launch an IPO may be shut out from gaining resources to pursue their entrepreneurial 
opportunities. These opportunities may also extend to the ability to gain scale and 
experience effects, reputation effects, and network effects, and to lead development of 
organizational capabilities (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Schultz, 2000). By 
ignoring these benefits, firms may be foregoing the competitive advantages that stem from 
such growth opportunities and may be allowing others to preempt the market. Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 5A: High levels of product market competition will increase the 
likelihood of IPO launch. 
Similar to the effect of competition in the product market, when there are low levels 
of IPO offerings, firms will likely avoid rivalry in their IPO launch decision. This is 
because firms that launch an IPO when there are few IPO offerings will provoke attention 
from other firms of their need to acquire capital resources from investors. Firms that follow 
prior IPO launches can gain information about investor allocation, pricing strategy, and 
cost advantages in the IPO launch process. This could place the firms that launched their 
IPO earlier at a disadvantage in terms of the amount of resources gained. 
However, when there are many IPO offerings in the market, firms will launch their 
IPO early. Firms that delay their IPO may be foregoing the competitive advantages that 
stem from such growth opportunities, and allow others to preempt the market. As one firm 
exercises its option to launch an IPO under these conditions, others will be influenced to 
enter quickly, triggering a bandwagon effect. This effect was evident during the late 1990s, 
when there were many offerings in the stock market among Internet companies and several 
Internet companies launched their IPOs early in order to gain early advantages in resource 
acquisition and capabilities development (Schultz and Zaman, 2001). 
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In addition to preempting the market for resources, high levels of IPO offerings 
may induce firms to launch IPOs in order to develop the ability to engage in rivals’ 
potentially predatory tactics (Povel and Raith, 2004). Firms that have high leverage are 
more likely to behave cautiously and are less aggressive in the product market (Brander 
and Lewis, 1986; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). The inability of firms to take an 
aggressive stance encourages predatory behavior by rivals, because firms that have 
substantial amounts of capital or easy access to it can sustain losses until they succeed in 
eliminating competition in the market (Teslar, 1996; Kanatas and Qi, 2001). Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 5B: High levels of competition in the IPO offerings market will 
increase the likelihood of IPO launch. 
4.5  The Moderating Effects of Competition on Likelihood of IPO  
Beside the independent effects of uncertainty and competition on the likelihood of 
IPO launch, the interplay of these components is likely to influence the likelihood of IPO 
launch. The effects of this interplay may also vary based on the source of uncertainty and 
the type of competition (product market or stock market) that the firm faces. To examine 
the interplay between competition and uncertainty, I highlight the moderating role of 
competition within the product market and the stock market. This premise is based on 
research that competition is a key factor affecting firms’ strategy and decision making 
under uncertain conditions (Porter, 1980). 
Some literature suggests that the presence of competition under uncertainty may 
induce firms to take action due to two key factors: (1) increased entrepreneurial discovery 
and recognition, and (2) lowered value of deferral options. First, competition increases 
firms’ ability to discover and recognize opportunities through increased available 
information and activities. Research has shown that entrepreneurs that have extensive 
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informal networks (i.e., customers, suppliers, employees of financial institutions) and 
frequently attend industry-related activities (i.e., conferences, seminars, and workshops) 
will have heightened knowledge of information within their industry (Ozgen and Baron, 
2007). The ability to gain insights into information within the industry through these 
sources enhances entrepreneurs’ alertness to opportunities (Baron, 2006). Such sources of 
information are likely to be more numerous when there are a large number of firms or 
rivalries within the same industry. In addition, from an equilibrium economy approach, the 
presence of competitive action within the same industry provides even more opportunity to 
observe errors such as the competition’s shortages, surplusses, and misallocated resources, 
thus increasing the level of entrepreneurial activity (Kirzner, 1973). 
Second, the presence of competition quickly erodes any deferral options that a firm 
may hold (Grenadier, 2002; Trigeorgis, 1993). This is because competitive firms seeking to 
optimize the values of their own holdings will incorporate expectations about moves by the 
competition and include them in decisions about timing of action (Miller and Folta, 2002). 
Thus, when the threat of competition exists, despite any prior high values of deferral 
options derived from high values of uncertainty, firms will take action. 
The two factors mentioned above suggest that the presence of competition will 
moderate the relationship between uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO. However these 
two factors assume the presence of blind spots. Blind spots exist as a result of 
“competitors’ insufficient consideration of the contingent decisions of their competitive 
others” (Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). The presence of blind spots allows firms to act 
without immediate reactions (Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 2006). Hence, with the presence of 
blind spots, when high levels of uncertainty exist, firms will be able to leverage the 
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resultant entrepreneurial opportunities and gain competitive advantage. However, if blind 
spots do not exist, the two factors mentioned above may not hold as any action taken may 
be quickly matched by competition. The potential response from rivals may deter firms 
from launching their IPO. The different characteristics of the general environment may 
represent the existence of blind spots, which may result in different actions under 
uncertainty and competition. 
4.5.1  Product Market 
In the descriptions offered in the preceding sections, the entrepreneur ex ante 
recognizes the opportunities inherent the market, and achieves advantage from the 
opportunities over time. Entrepreneurs are able to take advantage of such opportunities due 
to the presence of competitors’ blind spots (Grimm, Lee, and Smith, 2006; Zajac and 
Bazerman, 1991). However, the process of an IPO launch may erode blind spots, thus 
diminishing the competitive advantage from entrepreneurial activities. This is because the 
process of launching an IPO requires firms to disclose to investors and the public relevant 
information necessary for the valuation of the firm, both during the IPO launch period and 
periodically after it. Such disclosure of firm valuation may subject firms to leakage of 
confidential information regarding their product strategy and tactics (Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1999; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999). Not only will the process of an IPO 
launch diminish any entrepreneurial opportunities that a firm may have identified, but it 
may also place a firm at a competitive disadvantage to both listed and private firms. Thus, 
such conditions will induce firms to forego any potential opportunities by not launching an 
IPO. By doing so, firms may forego some entrepreneurial activities, but will be able to 
sustain their business and avoid confrontation with or retaliation from rivals (Grimm, Lee, 
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and Smith, 2006). Therefore, under high uncertainty in product market demand, when there 
are high levels of competition in the product market, launching an IPO early may be 
disadvantageous. Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 6A: The higher the level of product market competition, the level of 
product demand uncertainty will have a stronger negative effect on 
the likelihood of IPO launch. 
4.5.2  Stock Market 
Contrary to the interplay of product market uncertainty and product market 
competition, the interplay of stock return uncertainty and competition for funding in the 
IPO offerings market will likely have a stronger positive effect on the likelihood of IPO 
launch because (1) the abundance of information regarding the stock market will increase 
the value of launching an IPO, and (2) the disadvantages of not becoming a public firm will 
be too great to ignore. First, when there are high levels of competition for funding in the 
IPO offerings market, substantial levels of information and activities will be available to 
entrepreneurs contemplating an IPO launch. Information regarding IPO firms’ launch 
process, launch price, and growth opportunities, in general, will be disseminated through 
various means. This will provide firms with a better understating of their own growth 
opportunities, which may have been unclear previously (e.g., Dow and Gorton, 1997; Ang, 
Cole, and Lin, 2000). Also, several actors, such as investment bankers and investors will 
become more visible and play an important role in disseminating information about the IPO 
process and the value that firms can gain through an IPO. This will reduce the cost required 
in launching an IPO, which in effect will increase the value of an IPO launch. Having 
increased information regarding an IPO launch and the necessary support for it will likely 
decrease firms’ uncertainty in their IPO launch decision. In addition, by waiting too long to 
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launch an IPO, firms not only risk losing valuable growth opportunities as the growth 
option values diminishes over time, but also may incur increased expenses due to the need 
to recreate the IPO activities that they could have piggy-backed on when competition was 
high. 
 Second, when the level of growth opportunities and competition for funding in the 
stock market is high, rivals may take advantage of the market and preempt resources. 
While some strategic advantages may erode due to leakage (e.g., Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1999), by waiting too long to launch an IPO, firms may be totally left out of the 
market. This may not only reduce their ability to compete effectively in the future, but may 
also induce aggressive behavior from rivals (e.g., Fudenburg and Tirole, 1986). 
Therefore, the above two reasons combined suggest that under high levels of 
uncertainty and competition in the stock market, firms are likely to be motivated to launch 
their IPOs. Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 6B: The higher the level of competition in the IPO offerings market, the 
level of stock uncertainty will have a stronger positive effect on the 
likelihood of IPO launch. 
Table 6 summarizes the theories of firm actions and strategic considerations in the IPO 
context under a continuous time flow. 
4.6  Positive Shock and IPO Timing 
Hypotheses 1–6 were offered as if there had not been a discontinuous time flow. 
However, Schumpeter (1934) noted that periods of market efficiency are punctuated by 
periods of upheaval due to discontinuous shocks, and that entrepreneurial actions are likely 
to occur during these periods. This punctuated time flow approach follows the notion that 
entrepreneurs use benchmarks or long-term growth trends as references, and take action 
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when there is a high deviation from the benchmark or trends. This perspective contrasts 
with hypotheses 1–6 in noting that entrepreneurs are more likely to act when there is 
information of high relevance that is disconnected from the past. Early work on firms’ 
actions in accordance with a punctuated time flow include that of Kogut (1991), who found 
that sudden increases in short-term profit rates induces firms to take action, and Lant and 
Mezias (1992), who found that changes in the fundamentals of the environment increase 
the likelihood of significant organizational change. (Table 7 summarizes the continuous 
time flow and punctuated time flow with respect to IPO decisions). 
The use of benchmarks or references in taking action is supported by research in 
decision making. In decision-making theory, individuals may not have the ability to detect 
or assess opportunities, and thus they rely on only a few cues from available information 
when making decisions (Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Camerer, 1981). If there are no formal 
contracts or indicators of the value of going public, the IPO launch will likely be triggered 
by cues in the product market and stock market that signal a rise in the value to be gained 
from the launch relative to long-term market trends.  
In the context of the product market, Porter (1980) noted that when firms anticipate 
an increase in product demand, capacity expansion in production will become a game of 
preemption. For preemption to succeed, firms must move earlier than their competitors in 
securing the resources for production and entering the market (Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988), and they must make sure that they are not preempted by their rivals. 
Therefore, firms that face a positive demand shock will likely anticipate large growth 
potential and will launch an IPO in order to increase their capacity for production and to 
preempt the market. This corroborates Clementi’s (2002) research, which found a high 
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correlation between firms going public and the degree of required productivity increase. 
Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 7A: The higher the increase in the product demand trend, the higher 
the likelihood of IPO launch. 
Stock market returns of firms in the same or similar industries act as a signal of 
market growth, investment opportunities, and favorable investor sentiment. As discussed in 
the previous section, high market growth potential and increased investment opportunities 
will induce firms to compete in order to secure the resources for production (Lieberman 
and Montgomery, 1988). Favorable investor sentiment will allow firms to gain access to 
capital at a cheaper price (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Rajan and Servaes, 1997; Pagano, 
Panetta, and Zingales, 1998). Therefore, firms that face a positive shock in stock market 
valuations in the same or a similar industry will likely anticipate high growth potential and 
will exercise the option to launch an IPO in order to increase their capacity for production 
and preempt the market, while taking advantage of cheap funding. Thus, 
HYPOTHESIS 7B: The higher the increase in stock market return trends, the higher 
the likelihood of IPO launch. 
 
4.7  Summary 
Figures 2 and 3 contain the models of IPO likelihood that provide details of the 
specific relationships that the hypotheses in this chapter are testing. The models suggest 
that firms determine the timing of their IPO launch based on their level of venture capitalist 
involvement, strategic considerations such as product market uncertainty, stock market 
uncertainty, and competition. Integrating the perspective of entrepreneurial action, real 
options reasoning, and competitive dynamics, product market and stock market uncertainty 
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is expected to induce firms to either defer or accelerate the timing of their IPO launch 
based on the level of the involvement by the venture capitalist. Firms with low levels of 
venture capitalist involvement take an entrepreneurial action approach, in which the 
likelihood of an IPO launch increases with the level of uncertainty in the market, whereas 
firms with high levels of such involvement act in accordance with a real options reasoning 
approach in which the likelihood of an IPO launch decreases with the level of uncertainty 
in the market. The likelihood of IPO is also influenced by the level of irreversibility of the 
IPO decision, competition, and sudden increases in stock market and product demand 
trends. While irreversibility negatively moderates the likelihood of IPO launch, the effect 
of moderation by the level of competition on the likelihood of IPO depends on the source 
and type of competition. Competition in the stock market positively moderates the effect of 
stock return uncertainty on the likelihood of IPO launch, whereas competition in the 
product market negatively moderates the effect of product market uncertainty on likelihood 
of IPO launch. 
 Chapter 5 provides an overview of the research methods, including sample and 







CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter I describe the methodological approach used to test my hypotheses. I 
begin by providing the details of my data sources and the sample selection process. I also 
describe the key variables used in analyzing my constructs and the methodology used for 
testing the hypotheses.  
5.1   Sample Design and Data 
The sample for this study consists of private US manufacturing firms that were 
founded from 1980 through 1996. The firms in the sample are firms that had received 
funding through venture capital firms, mezzanine financing, preferred shares, or some 
combination thereof. The use of firms that had sought funding through these means ensured 
that the sample consisted of high growth firms likely to seek an IPO in the future. This is 
because venture capitalists, investors, or mezzanine finance providers typically seek 
companies with potential for rapid and substantial growth that will need substantial capital 
from large investors to finance their growth. Firms with limited products and slower 
growth are not candidates for such funding and usually fulfill financing from friends or 
business angels rather than through venture capitalists or mezzanine financing (Smith and 
Smith, 2004:499). The use of the category of firms selected allowed examination of firm-
level attributes such as whether the firms were venture capital-backed or not, and if so, the 
amount of capital investments received during each stage of growth.  
The sample was collected from the SDC Platinum VentureXpert database published 
by Thompson Financial. The database provides comprehensive information on firms that 
 
have received funding from venture capitalists and mezzanine financers. The database 
includes information on the sector of the firm, the amount of financing received, the timing 
and amount of financing, the status of the firm (i.e., private, public, subsidiary, bankrupt, 
acquired, etc.), and the name of the financers. I tracked data from each sample firm from 
the time of founding until the end of 1996 and recorded the date the firm went public. For 
the firms that did not launch an IPO during the sample time period, I noted whether they 
remained private or ceased operations. Spin-offs, reverse-leverage buyouts, unit offerings, 
and firms that went bankrupt prior to the founding date were excluded from the sample.3 
The period after 1996 was not sampled for two reasons. First, after 1996, several 
firms were subject to the “bubble,” and a large number of firms launched IPOs for reasons 
other than carrying out a competitive strategy. Second, in 1997, the US Census Bureau 
changed the standard industry classification from the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. The 
conversion limited my ability to compare time series information for a large number of 
manufacturing firms before and after 1997.  
Other data that complemented this sample were gathered from secondary sources: 
the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (US Census Bureau), COMPUSTAT, the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), SDC Mergers & Acquisitions, and various company 
prospectuses and proxy statements. 
                                                 
3 Such firms were excluded to ensure that all firms in the sample are firms that had past their start-up phase, 
but were still defined as entrepreneurial, and were not subsidiaries of corporations. Entrepreneurial firms that 
were eventually acquired or went through a merger and acquisition process were still tracked from the time of 
establishment until the time that the “hazard” occurred, and were censored at the time of the hazard. Thus, 
any competing risks that a typical entrepreneurial firm may face were still accounted for in the analysis. 
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5.2  Key Variables and Measures 
5.2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable for Hypotheses 1–7 is the likelihood of the IPO launch. 
This was measured in terms of the instantaneous risk or event that a firm would go public 
in any given time interval. The use of the likelihood of IPO as a dependent variable fulfills 
the research’s objective of trying to understand whether an IPO launch would occur early 
or later. This is because the likelihood of IPO can be regarded as the inverse of the time to 
IPO; on the average, firms with low likelihoods of IPOs will take longer for their IPO event 
to occur, whereas firms with high likelihoods of IPOs will take less time for their IPO event 
to occur.  
A hazard model was used to measure the likelihood that an IPO event would occur 
(see section 5.3.1). A logistic regression was not used to measure the likelihood of IPO as 
the dependent variable because it ignores information on the timing of the IPO and its time-
varying covariates. I also did not employ the length of time between the firm’s founding 
date and the date of its IPO as a dependent variable, because my methodology incorporates 
the censoring of firms that had not launched an IPO by the end of the study period. 
5.2.2 Independent Variables 
5.2.1.1 Product Demand Uncertainty and Shock  
Product demand uncertainty was measured using the randomness in the annual US 
value of product shipments taken from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers (US Census 
Bureau) at the 3–digit level of the SIC classification for the years 1958–1996. First, the 
value of product shipments for all industries was adjusted to 1980 dollars based on the 
consumer price index (CPI) in order to account for inflation. Next, the value of product 
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shipment data was normalized by dividing the shipment value for each year by the value 
for the year 1980, the first year in the time series for each industry. In other words, the 
value of shipments for 1980 was set to a benchmark of 100. I then compared the shipment 
value for each of the remaining years against the 1980 value for that industry. This 
approach is similar to that used by Kogut (1991) in comparing the value of product demand 
across time. 
In order to measure the randomness in product demand, a generalized auto-
regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) procedure was used. Previous 
measures of demand uncertainty have relied mainly on using parameters based on a fixed 
number of the most recent observations (e.g., Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven, 2006). 
This assumes equal weights for past parameters and does not account for the possibility of 
heteroskedasticty across time. In contrast, the GARCH procedure incorporates the 
weighted average of the long-run average variance prior to the current period based on the 
calculated past variances, the variance predicted for the current period, and the new 
information in the current period captured by the most recent squared residual (Engle, 
2001). In addition, in the GARCH procedure, although the weighted average of the long-
run average variance in the past remains in the model at a declining weight over time, it 
does not reduce to zero. Thus, the GARCH procedure accounts for the heteroskedasticity of 
the variance, providing a better measure of the uncertainty that firms face that is not 
predictable for any trend that might exist at different points of the time series prior to the 
current period.  
Specifically, for this research, a GARCH-M model was employed to calculate the 
uncertainty of product demand, as it allows for the specification of the number of lags in 
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the variances that are included in the current variance (Bollerslev, 1986; Engle, 2001; 
Christoffersen and Jacobs, 2004). The function form used to calculate the demand 
uncertainty is as follows: 
yt  =  xt β + γ h t + u , 
where yt is the value of the product shipments and ht is the annual conditional error 
variance generated. Thus, the square root of ht is the estimate of product demand 
uncertainty. Residual γ is modeled as  
ut  =  h t  · vt , 
where vt represents independent, identically distributed random noise with a zero mean and 
unit variance, and ht is expressed as  
ht  =  k + δ1ht−1 + δ2ht−2 +……+ δpht−p + 
      α1u2t−1 + α2u2t−2  + ……+ αqu2t−q  . 
Here, p specifies the number of lags for the squared error terms and q specifies the number 
of variances included in the model. In the IPO timing model, a one-period lag for both 
parameters was used, as empirical evidence has proven that using small lags for both 
parameters is sufficient to model the variance over long sample periods (French, Schwert, 
and Stambaugh, 1987; Franses and Van Dijk, 1996). For each industry, an individual time 
series was fitted to a GARCH procedure (i.e., for SIC 208, GARCH models were produced 
for years 1958 to 1980 for the level of uncertainty at 1980, 1958 to 1981 for the level of 
uncertainty at 1981, 1958 to 1982 for the level of uncertainty at 1982, and so on). This 
allowed me to approximate the time-varying estimates of uncertainty for each industry at 
different points of time across the time series of 1980–1996. The level of product demand 
uncertainty was also calculated at the second power (h) in order to capture any possible 
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nonlinear effects of product demand uncertainty on the timing of the IPO. The use of a 
GARCH model to measure product demand uncertainty follows the same use of Folta and 
O’Brien (2004) on product sales to measure uncertainty. 
Similar to the method used in Kogut (1991), product demand shock was also 
assessed directly from the product shipment data using a measure of the increase in the 
product demand trend. To do this, I divided the value of the normalized product shipment 
by the value of the three-year-lagged normalized product shipment. This measure takes the 
approach that firms make production decisions based on previous demand and look at 
departures from this trend as a signal to change production capabilities. 
5.2.1.2 Stock Return Uncertainty and Shock  
In this study, stock return uncertainty was measured using the randomness of 
monthly stock market returns for firms in the same industry. Lerner (1994b) showed that an 
industry-specific index is the preferred method of capturing the changes in equity markets, 
as times of high market returns or valuations vary across industries and are not always in 
complete alignment with trends in the general market. I used Lerner’s methodology to 
develop stock indexes for each group of industries in the manufacturing firm sample. First, 
firms’ monthly stock market returns were obtained from CRSP for the years 1958–1996 at 
the SIC 3-digit level. Next, the industry-wide stock market returns were calculated by 
adding the monthly stock returns of the firms in each industry, weighted by the market 
capitalization of the individual firms. I then employed a GARCH-M model to measure the 
uncertainty in the stock market returns. For each industry, I fitted the time-series data using 
a GARCH procedure, to approximate the time-varying estimates of stock market return 
uncertainty at different points across the time series. GARCH models are regarded as 
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appropriate for forecasting volatility in stock market returns, as they remove excess 
kurtosis in market returns and account for the clustering of volatility in market returns—
two unique dimensions of stock market returns (Chong, Ahmad, and Abdullah, 1999). 
These two characteristics are not accounted for in conventional time-series procedures and 
econometric models. Similar to the calculations for product demand uncertainty, a second-
power test of the stock market return uncertainty was conducted to take into account any 
possible nonlinear effects of stock market return uncertainty on the IPO timing. Other 
researchers in the field of strategy who have used the GARCH model on stock returns to 
measure uncertainty include Wu, Levitas, and Priem (2005). 
Stock return shock was measured by comparing the increase in firms’ monthly 
market-to-book ratios against the average market-to-book ratios of firms in the same 
industry for the preceding 36 months. The intuition is that as there is no long-term trend in 
market-to-book ratios, firms will compare the current market-to-book ratio against the 
nearest average benchmark as an indicator of a rise in growth option values. The stock 
return shock was calculated as follows: 
 SRSt,i  =  log (Mt,i/B t,i) – log (Mt−1 ~ t−36,i /B t−1 ~ t−36,i) , 
where the stock return shock (SRS) is the difference between the current value of the log of 
the market-to-book ratio (Mt,i/Bt,i) for the ith industry at time t, and the log of the average 
market-to-book ratio (Mt−1 ~ t−12,i /Bt−1 ~ t−12,i) for the previous 12 months for the ith industry. 
All data for market-to-book ratios were obtained from the CRSP database on a monthly 
basis for the years 1977–1996. Other researchers in the field of strategy who have used the 
increase in market-to-book ratio to measure stock return shock include Arthur (2003). 
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5.2.1.3 Product Market Competition 
The degree of competition in the product market was measured using the Blau 
index (Blau, 1977), which is the inverse of the Herfindahl index (Blau index = 1 – 
Herfindahl index). This follows several researchers who have used the Herfindahl index to 
measure the degree of competition among firms (e.g., Fischer and Pollack, 2002; Douglas 
and Judge, 2001; Baum and Korn, 1996; Boyd, 1990). The Herfindahl index represents the 
sum of the squared market shares of all listed firms within a particular industry. Therefore, 
a higher Blau index (or a lower Herfindahl index) represents a greater presence of 
competition in the product market. Higher levels of competition create competitive 
uncertainty because high levels of connectedness between firms within an industry can 
induce change and disrupt the status quo at any time without notice, producing 
unanticipated consequences for industry members (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). 
The data used to calculate the Blau index at the SIC 3-digit level was obtained from 
two sources: the Herfindahl index from the US Census Bureau and COMPUSTAT 
Industrial. The advantage of using the US Census Bureau’s industry concentration data is 
that they are a direct measure of the degree of competition at the product level as opposed 
to the firm level (the firm level could include several different products with different SIC 
codes). The major disadvantage is that the Herfindahl index is only available every fourth 
year. Thus, the Herfindahl index based on Census Bureau data does not capture volatility 
within the four-year interval. 
The advantage of using COMPUSTAT Industrial data to calculate the Blau index is 
that industry information is available annually, thus capturing the volatility at yearly 
intervals. The disadvantage is that these data are a direct measure of the degree of 
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competition at the firm level. Thus, the Herfindahl index based on COMPUSTAT data may 
capture several different levels of products with different SIC codes. However, firms’ 
perception of competition is defined by major lines of business in which the core 
businesses of firms, even for diversified firms, can become the dominant frame of reference 
(Porter, 1980; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Thus, competition among firms may not be based 
on one SIC classification, but related SIC classifications, especially when firms achieve 
economies of scale and produce complementary products. Another disadvantage is that 
information from COMPUSTAT tends to have a higher proportion of firms that have large 
sales volumes and firms that have gone public. 
5.2.1.4 Competition in the IPO Offerings Market 
The degree of competition in the IPO offerings market was measured by using the 
number of firms in the same industry at the 2-digit SIC code that had launched IPOs in the 
same year (excluding the focal firm). Higher levels of IPO launches within the same 
industry represent greater competition for investor funding in the IPO offerings market 
among similar firms. The data used to calculate the level of IPO competition were obtained 
from CRSP. This follows several strategy and finance researchers who have used the 
number of IPO launches to measure the degree of competition in the stock market (e.g., 
Ritter, 1984; Stuart et. al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003).  
5.2.1.5 Reversibility 
The degree of IPO reversibility (or the inverse of irreversibility) was measured by 
the number of leveraged-buyout (LBO) and management-buyout (MBO) activities for each 
industry at the SIC 2-digit level. The level of LBOs and MBOs was used as a proxy for 
reversibility because for firms that have not yet launched their IPO, the cost of reversing an 
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IPO cannot be determined as the price of buying back shares and effort in reversing the 
public status will only be determined once an IPO has been launched. In such a situation, 
firms are likely to use benchmarks in the market to determine their level of reversibility. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) stated that targets or reference points are typically used by 
firms when evaluating choices. Availability of a reference point will allow decision makers 
to use a more rationale approach in their decision making process (Tenbrunsel, Wade-
Benzoni, Messick, and Bazerman, 2000).  
Thus the use of LBOs and MBOs is based on the assumption that the ability of 
firms to effectively “reverse their IPO” and go private depends on the availability of LBOs 
and MBOs in the industry, and that certain industries are more likely to have LBO 
activities than others (Ambose and Winters, 2001). First, for an LBO to occur, most firms 
within the same industry must generate enough cash flow to service the debt generally 
required in an LBO (Jensen, 1989; Ambose and Winters, 2001). The level of cash flow for 
this purpose will differ by industry. Second, some industries are regulated and may have a 
lower ability to go private (Ambose and Winters, 2001). Given the industry effect of LBOs, 
the availability of LBOs within an industry provides an indication of the reversibility of 
IPOs. This is because the availability of LBOs demonstrates the availability of support for 
the reinstalling the intangible components of IPO reversals, such as debt funding and 
revival of constructive relationships among owners, managers, and other corporate 
stakeholders. The data for LBO availability were obtained from SDC Mergers & 
Acquisitions. 
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5.2.1.6 Venture Capital Involvement in Decision Making 
The level of involvement of the venture capitalist in the decision making was 
measured by the amount of capital that the firm had received from their venture capitalists. 
This follows prior research in which the amount of investment shows both the sunk cost 
that the venture capitalist has invested in a firm and the extent of accountability among the 
investors (Staw, 1976; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In addition, prior research has 
shown that in partnerships, the size of partners’ investments may affect the level of the 
partner’s involvement in the firm (Parkhe, 1993). In particular, venture capitalists receive 
voting rights in accordance with the amount invested as if they hold common shares in a 
firm (Gompers, 1996). Research has also suggests that the greater the venture capital 
funding, the more frequently the venture capitalists monitor firms and become involved 
with key decisions (Gompers, 1996). Therefore, the level of capital investment provides an 
indication of the amount of influence by venture capitalists. 
5.2.3 Control Variables 
I controlled for several firm-specific and industry factors identified as relevant to 
the IPO timing in the strategy and finance literature. Firm-specific factors included the age 
of the firm, the age of the venture capital firm, and the cumulative level of capital invested 
in the firm by the venture capitalist. Industry factors include the industry market-to-book 
ratio and the level of borrowing by each industry. 
The rationale for controlling for the age of the firm is that older firms may be easier 
for outsiders to evaluate, resulting in less duplication of information needed for an IPO 
launch (Myers and Mjluf, 1984; Chenmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). In addition, the age of 
the firm also provides an indication of the stage of the firm’s growth (Maug, 2001; Schultz, 
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2000). The age value of the firm was calculated by taking the natural log of the difference 
between the date of a firm's IPO and its founding date. The age was calculated on a 
monthly basis.  
I controlled for the age of the venture capital firms because younger venture capital 
firms have been found to take companies public earlier than older venture capital firms 
(Gompers, 1996). This is because younger venture capital firms need to establish a 
reputation and successfully raise capital for new funds. By taking firms public early, young 
venture capital firms gain reputation benefits that may support their raise of capital. I 
measured the age of the venture capital firms in months from the date of their establishment 
to the time of the IPO launch. In periods where firms have no association with venture 
capital firms, the age of the venture capital firm was recorded as zero. The data on the age 
of the firm and their venture capital firms were obtained from SDC VentureXpert.  
The rationale for controlling for the cumulative level of venture capital investment 
that each firm had received is that uncertainty about the quality of young entrepreneurial 
firms is likely to exist among potential investors (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Gulati 
and Higgins, 2003). As a result the estimated value of a firm’s IPO launch and the ability of 
the firm to launch an IPO may be affected by the level of confidence that venture capitalists 
are willing to invest in the firm. The level of investments held by a firm also provides an 
indication of the level of influence that a firm may receive from its venture capitalists in 
IPO decision making. Firms that have high levels of capital investments from venture 
capitalists will likely have higher levels of involvement from venture capitalists and need to 
provide voting rights on key decisions (MacMillan et al., 1989; Zider, 1998). The 
cumulative level of venture capital investments was measured on a monthly basis. 
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The industry market-to-book ratio was controlled for because it allowed me to 
control for differences among industries with respect to industry growth potential (e.g., 
Folta and O’Brien, 2004; Lehn, Netter, and Poulsen, 1990) and investor sentiment toward 
certain industries (Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001) across different time periods. According 
to financial theory, there are windows of opportunities or periods in which the stock 
performance of firms within certain industries may create an environment conducive to 
IPOs (e.g., Lowry, 2003; Pagan, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998; Rajan and Servaes, 1997). 
For example, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) found that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the industry market-to-book ratio raised the odds of an IPO by 25%. 
Lastly, the market value of bank debt for each industry was also controlled for, as 
the level of borrowing has been documented to influence the likelihood of IPO. Harris and 
Raviv (1990) found that firms with a high level of borrowing have already been scrutinized 
by lenders, leading to lower costs of producing information for investors, and thus they 
have a higher likelihood of launching an IPO. However, conversely, investors may also 
perceive high levels of borrowing as a potential risk factor and exercise an extra degree of 
caution when making investments. Thus, unless they are severely underpriced, firms with 
high levels of bank debt will be less likely to launch an IPO and will instead pursue other 
alternatives, such as takeovers (Brau, Francis, and Kohers, 2003). In this dissertation I 
follow Brau, Francis, and Kohers (2003) and use the industry-wide level of bank debt as a 
proxy for the level of borrowings of private firms, because actual information on private 
firms’ borrowings is difficult to obtain. The use of the proxy is justified by evidence of a 
strong intra-industry correlation of bank debt levels between private and public funding 
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(Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984). The degree of bank debt was measured as the book value 
of firm debt (long-term and short-term debt).  
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Hazard Model 
I used a hazard model to measure the likelihood of IPO launch. This model 
estimates the instantaneous risk that the firm will go public in any given time interval. My 
model follows the early works of Kogut (1991) and Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels (1999) in 
modeling the likelihood of events. To measure the likelihood of IPO launch, I first 
constructed a baseline model of the likelihood of launching an IPO, L(t): 
L(t)i  =  lim [qi (t, t + ∆t)/∆t] , 
where q is the probability that a firm will go public between any two discrete points in time 
t. This baseline model describes the probability that a firm will go public, assuming no 
exogenous influences. Next, I used a piecewise exponential model to estimate the effects of 
the independent variables and control variables on the likelihood of IPO launch. This 
model provides flexibility and does not require heavy dependence on the time span or the 
age of the firm. The model assumes that the baseline transition rate is constant within each 
age period but can vary across periods. The model for the estimated likelihood of IPO 
launch is as follows: 
  L(t)*i  = L(t) exp(αUncert + βRevt + γCompt + δShockt + λX + ζConit) , 
where L(t) represents the baseline hazard rate; Uncer is the matrix of the value of the 
uncertainty factors obtained from the GARCH model (product demand uncertainty and 
stock return uncertainty), as well as the value of the residual errors; Rev is the measure of 
reversibility; Comp is the degree of competition (product market competition and 
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competition in the IPO offerings market); Shock is the matrix of the shock variables 
(product demand and stock market shock); X is the matrix of the interaction of the key 
variables; and Con is the matrix of control variables. The variables α, β, γ, δ, λ, and ζ are 
the parameters to be estimated. Because the variables in the model change over time, the 
time series of the model was conducted on a monthly basis. 
Theoretically, this model is equivalent to a Cox semi-parametric model showing a 
hump-shaped pattern: the likelihood of IPO launch first increases as the firm perceives less 
uncertainty, and then it decreases. The decrease is due to the fact that if the firm has not 
launched its IPO within a certain number of years, it becomes less likely ever to do so. 
However, because the sampling period was 17 years (or 204 months), some firms that had 
not gone public by the end of the period might still have intended to do so but were not 
observed long enough. Also, the time window for observations differs for each firm 
depending on when it was founded. For example, in the sample, all firms were tracked until 
the end of 1996, so a firm founded in 1980 was tracked for 14 years, whereas one that was 
founded in 1990 was tracked for only 6 years. In order to take these issues into account, left 
truncation was employed for firms that had entered the sample late, and right censoring for 
firms that launched an IPO or had dropped out prior to the ending of the sample period. 







CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
 
The results presented in this chapter show that uncertainty affects firms’ IPO launch 
decisions differently, and that firms factor strategic implications into their IPO launch 
decisions. In particular, the likelihood of IPO launch depends on the level of uncertainty 
that firms face, the source of the uncertainty, and the degree of influence that venture 
capitalists exert in firms’ decision making. 
 In addition, the decision depends on the type of competition that the firm faces. 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 6.1 provides descriptive statistics of the 
sample, section 6.2 presents the results of a hazard model on the likelihood of IPO, and 
section 6.3 summarizes and discusses the results. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics provide an understanding of the level of uncertainty, 
competition, and irreversibility that a firm faces. They also provide an understanding of the 
firm-specific factors such as the sectors of firms that are sampled and analyzed in this 
dissertation. Tables 10 and 11 present the univariate statistics on the types of firms, the age 
of firms and their venture capitalists, and the amount of venture capital investments by 
industry at the 3-digit SIC code level. Tables 12–15 present the univariate statistics for 
factors such as the level of uncertainty, the level of competition, the level of reversibility, 
the industry market-to-book ratio, and the level of borrowings. In addition, correlations and 
VIF tests were used to understand the relationships between the variables and check for 
potential multicollinearity between the variables. These statistics appear in Tables 16–18.  
 
Table 10 shows the number of firms, by type in each sector. These statistics provide 
interesting insights. First, the major column labeled “No. of Firms” shows that the sample 
includes firms across 30 sectors, and that there are sufficient firms in most sectors to pick 
up any potential industry effects. This column also reveals that the distribution of firms 
across the sectors is not uniform; the medical instruments sector (SIC 384) has the largest 
number of firms in the sample (505 firms), and the petroleum and coal products sector (SIC 
299) and the textile wood working sector (SIC 355) have the lowest number of firms in the 
sample (one per sector). The breadth of industries (or multiple SIC codes) in the sample, 
the large number of firms in most of the industries, and the fact that subjects are tracked 
over several years is important for the research methodology. This is because investor 
sentiment toward IPOs in certain sectors has been shown to fluctuate in some years 
(Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001). Thus, the statistics confirm that any industry effects 
across years will be captured in the model. 
Second, 31.4% of the firms in this sample launched their IPO during 1980–1996. 
However, this rate varied greatly across sectors; firms in the medicinal chemicals sector 
(SIC 283) had the highest rate of IPO, at 53% of all firms, and firms in the mechanical 
tools sector (SIC 354) were among the lowest, at about 8%. 
Third, the second major column (labeled “No. of Firms with VC Funding”) and the 
third (labeled “No. of Firms Without VC Funding”) show the breakdown of the sample 
according to firm type. The sample shows that although the total number of firms that did 
and did not receive venture capital funding in each category is roughly equal, the 
proportion of firms that had launched IPOs differs by industry. For example, among firms 
that had launched their IPOs in the medicinal chemicals sector (SIC 283) the proportion of 
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those that had received venture capital funding was twice that of firms that had not. 
Conversely, in the construction machinery (SIC 353) and machinery tools (SIC 354) 
sectors, some firms that had no venture capital launched IPOs, but no firms that had 
received venture capital launched an IPO. This supports the notion that in some industries, 
the type and level of capital investments by venture capitalists may influence the likelihood 
of IPOs. These factors are controlled for in the model. 
Table 11 shows the average age of the firms, the average age of the venture 
capitalists, and the amount of cumulative venture capital funding held by firms. These 
statistics provide insights into the amount of firm-level uncertainty or the level of maturity 
of the firm, as well as the potential influence of venture capitalists at the time of the IPO 
launch. First, the age of the firm has been used to determine the amount of uncertainty that 
investors may have toward a firm. Older firms are likely be more established, have longer 
track records, and have more information available regarding them (Rock, 1986). These 
attributes decrease the uncertainty to prospective investors. The major column labeled 
“Ave. Firm Age at IPO” shows that the average age of firms in the sample at the time of 
IPO was 5.3 years. However, the average age of firms at IPO also differed greatly across 
sectors: firms in the plastic and synthetic resins sector (SIC 282) had the lowest average 
age at IPO (2.75 years) and firms in the machine and hand driven tools sector (SIC 354) 
had the highest average age at IPO (7.5 years). These differences were evident across 
sectors and among firms within similar product ranges and SIC codes. For example, firms 
in the industrial, machinery, and equipment industry sectors (SIC 35) varied between the 
construction machinery sector (SIC 353) in which the average age at IPO was close to four 
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years, and those in the machine and hand driven tools sector (SIC 354) in which the 
average age at IPO was about 8 years.  
Second, the major column labeled “Ave. VC Age at IPO” shows a large variance in 
the age of venture capitalists at the IPO timing. This large distribution is important because 
previous researchers have found that younger venture capitalists have greater propensity to 
push firms to go public early (Gompers, 1996). These effects are captured in the model as 
control variables. 
Third, the third major column (labeled “Ave. Investments Held”) and the forth 
(labeled “Ave. Investments Held at IPO”) show that the average amount of venture capital 
held by firms varied across firms and across the duration of the sample period. On average, 
firms held capital investments of $2.7 million across time (the average includes periods in 
which no capital investments were held by firms during the initial start-up period). The 
maximum amount of capital investments held at any given point of time was $389 million. 
There is a large variance in the amount of capital that firms held at the time of IPO, with 
values ranging from zero to $260 million of venture capital investments. The amount of 
capital held by each firm varied across time, and the level of investments at the time of IPO 
launch is not necessarily the highest. Again, this variance allows for capturing the level of 
venture capitalist influence, especially during the launch period.  
Table 12 shows the univariate statistics on the level of product demand uncertainty 
and stock return uncertainty of the 30 sectors across the 17–year period of this study. The 
level of uncertainty for both product demand and stock returns was measured by the 
conditional variances derived from the GARCH model. The values ranged from zero to 
one. Uncertainty values close to zero represent very low or no uncertainty and uncertainty 
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values close to one represent very high levels of uncertainty. These statistics reveal 
interesting differences across industries and time frames, and provide an indication that the 
differences between product demand uncertainty and stock return uncertainty merit 
separate examination. First, most industries show large variances in the level of uncertainty 
across time, with periods of very low levels of uncertainty (0.000) and periods of high 
uncertainty (>0.900) in both product demand and stock returns. Second, there is 
considerable variation between the levels of uncertainty in product demands and stock 
returns among sectors. For example, for the gum and wood chemicals sector (SIC 286), the 
level of product demand uncertainty was consistently low (0.000) across time. However, 
for the same sector, the level of stock return uncertainty remained relatively high (0.526 to 
0.915) throughout the 17–year period. Another example is the metal rolling sector 
(SIC335), in which the level of product demand uncertainty had large swings (0.000 to 
0.863) but the stock return uncertainty remained low (0.000) throughout the 17–year 
period. Only the pumps and compressor sector (SIC 356) and lab apparatus sector (SIC 
382) showed little difference in uncertainty in the product market and the stock market 
(comparison across the means yielded F=0.03 and F=3.774 at p> 0.05 respectively).  
Table 13 shows the univariate statistics on the level of competition in the product 
market (measured at the SIC 3-digit level) and the stock market (measured at the 2-digit 
level) across the 17-year period. These statistics reveal interesting differences across the 
two sources of competition. First, except for two sectors (SIC 334 and 393), there is little 
variation in the level of product market competition within each sector. On the contrary, 
there is considerable variation of competition for funding in the stock market across 
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industries: some industries had periods with no or few IPO launches (i.e., SIC 33), whereas 
some industries had many IPO launches throughout the 17 years (i.e., SIC 35).  
Table 14 shows the univariate statistics on the market-to-book ratio and the book 
value of debt of the sectors across the 17–year period. The market-to-book ratio confirms 
that some industries have a higher proportion of growth opportunities than others (Myers, 
1997), and that the level of growth opportunities changes across time. The statistics also 
suggest a large variance in the levels of borrowings across industries and across time. For 
example, in the plastics and synthetic resin sector (SIC 282) the level of total debt within 
the sector averaged $816 million, whereas in the musical instruments sector (SIC 393) the 
value was only $30 million. Also in the photographic equipment sector (SIC 393), the 
value of debt ranged from $50 million to $203 million across the 17–year period. These 
differences in borrowing suggest that firms in different sectors and during different periods 
may have different requirements for funding. The differences, which may influence the 
likelihood of IPO, are captured through the control variables. Table 15 summarizes the 
univariate statistics.  
Table 16 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the independent variables 
used in the hazard model that follows. The correlations show interesting patterns. First, 
there were no “large” values of bivariate correlations between independent variables: no 
correlations were greater than 0.4. Second, the correlation between product demand 
uncertainty and stock market uncertainty is low (0.02). This supports the assumption 
described in the earlier chapters that the product demand and stock return may not be 
highly correlated. Third, product market competition has some weak correlations with 
product demand uncertainty (-0.25), the level of competition for funding in the stock 
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market (0.25), and the industry market-to-book value (0.27). This is not surprising because 
firms may be more aggressive toward potential rivals when demand is stable. Similarly, 
industries with higher levels of market concentration will likely have more financial 
activities, resulting in higher amounts of competition in the stock market. In addition, 
industries with high valuations or high market-to-book ratios are likely to attract more 
firms; thus, competition among such firms is likely to be higher.  
Fourth, some weak correlations exist between the industry market-to-book ratio 
(control variable) and the level of competition for funding in the stock market (0.27) and 
the level of uncertainty in the stock market (-0.34). This, too, is not surprising because the 
level of market-to-book ratio also represents the potential amount of funding that a firm can 
gain through the stock market. Thus, higher market-to-book ratios will likely be followed 
by greater competition for funding through IPOs. Also, increases in stock prices above the 
book value will likely result in less stability in the market-to-book ratios. These 
correlations are unlikely to cause large econometric problems in the hazard model because 
the correlation levels are not high. This will be tested through variation inflation tests and 
condition indexes, and discussed in the next paragraphs.  
Table 17 shows the results of the tolerances or the variance inflation (VIF) tests 
among the control variables and the independent variables. All VIF indexes were less than 
2. Thus, there appears to be little need for concern about collinearity among the variables. 
This in accordance with the “rule of thumb” that variance inflation indexes of 10 or more 
may be a reason to be concerned about multicollinearity. 
Table 18 shows the results of the collinearity diagnostics tests. The highest 
condition index is about 9.4. This can be interpreted to indicate some very weak forms of 
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collinearity among some of the independent variables. According to the rule of thumb on 
collinearity diagnostics, when the condition index is 15 or higher, there may be some weak 
forms of collinearity; when the condition index is 30 or above, collinearity starts to become 
a great concern (Belsey, Kuh, and Welsh, 1980). To determine whether collinearity will 
affect the hazard model, detailed analysis and sensitivity tests were conducted for models 
1–15. First, both t-ratios for individual coefficients and the overall F-ratio were statistically 
significant. Second, all coefficients were stable when used with different combinations of 
samples and independent variables for slightly different specifications of the model. Third, 
as variables were added to the model, there were no signs of effects (e.g., switches from 
positive to negative or vice versa). The results of the analysis and sensitivity tests indicate 
that there is little reason to be concerned about collinearity in the model.  
6.2   Results 
Tables 19–22 show the results of the hazard model. Table 19 presents the base 
models of the relationship between uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO. Table 20 presents 
the impact of reversibility and venture capitalists’ influence on the likelihood of IPOs. 
Table 21 presents the impact of competition on the likelihood of IPO. Table 22 summarizes 
the likelihood of the IPO model based on a continuous time flow and presents the 
likelihood of the IPO model based on a punctuated time flow. For each of the individual 
coefficients, the parameter estimates, the significance of the parameter estimates, and the 
hazard ratio is reported. The significance of individual coefficients is interpreted using two-
tailed Wald chi-squared tests. For each model, a likelihood ratio test was conducted by 
comparing the key main variables and/or interaction variables against a specified base 
model. In addition, a figure of a baseline model of the likelihood of IPO (Figure 4) was 
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constructed in order to compare the cumulative function of IPO likelihood against the key 
effects (or time varying covariates). This baseline model represents the function of time 
variance alone without the covariates (i.e., the likelihood of IPO across time without the 
influence of the external environment).  
6.2.1  The Base Model: Control Variables  
Model 1 of Table 19 reports the estimation of the effects of the control variables on 
the likelihood of IPO. The age of the firm, the age of the venture capitalist, the amount of 
venture capital investments held, and the industry market-to-book ratio were all positively 
associated with the likelihood of IPO, whereas the level of bank borrowing was negatively 
associated with the likelihood of IPO. Among these variables, the age of the venture 
capitalist and the level of the market-to-book ratio had the most significance; an increase in 
venture capitalist age by one year increased the likelihood of IPO by approximately 34% 
and an increase in the market-to-book ratio by unit increased it by 37%. Together these 
control variables account for approximately 40% of the variance in the base model. This 
level of variance is in accordance with previous studies in finance on firms’ IPO timing 
(Lowry, 2003; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998; Gompers, 1996)4.  
                                                 
4 No studies carry the same variables as the control models used in this research that can be used as a direct 
comparison. Also, existing studies only include samples of firms that have already launched IPOs. However, 
the similarities in some of the variables used and the similar range of R2 value indicate that the control model 
accords with previous studies. A model on age at IPO (which included the following variables: size of the 
IPO offering, the underwriter rank, and the amount of VC investments held) had an R2 of 23.2% (Gompers, 
1996). A model on the number of IPOs launches (which included the following variables: market-to-book 
ratio and equally weighted market returns) had an R2 of 23.7% (Lowry, 2003). And a model of the probability 
that a firm will go public (which included the following variables; sales, capital expenditure, return on assets 
(ROA), the level of firm borrowings, and the market to book ratio, had an R2 of 14.3% (Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales, 1998). 
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6.2.2 The Effects of Uncertainty: Hypotheses 1A-2B 
The key independent variables—product demand uncertainty and stock return 
uncertainty—were added in Model 2 and Model 3 separately in order to determine their 
effects separately, and then added jointly in Model 4. Model 2 shows that product demand 
uncertainty is negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of IPO: an increase in 
product demand uncertainty by one unit decreases the likelihood of IPO by approximately 
35% (Hazard ratio 0.646 -1). This supports the theory of real options reasoning that under 
uncertain product market conditions, firms will defer their IPO. This relationship is 
depicted in Figure 5. Thus, Hypothesis 1A is contradicted, but its counter hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 2A, is supported. Model 3 shows that stock return uncertainty is positively and 
significantly related to the likelihood of IPO: an increase in stock return uncertainty by one 
unit increases the likelihood of IPO by approximately 80%. This supports the theory of 
entrepreneurial action that under uncertain stock market conditions, firms will take action. 
This relationship is depicted in Figure 6. Thus, Hypothesis 1B is supported but its counter 
hypothesis, Hypothesis 2B, is contradicted. Model 4 shows the effects of product demand 
uncertainty and stock return uncertainty combined, in which the relationship found in 
Model 2 and Model 3 is maintained, although the significance of the product demand 
uncertainty on the likelihood of IPO is weakened.5 The likelihood ratio tests (goodness-of-
fit between two models) indicates that the addition of product demand uncertainty and 
stock return uncertainty (Model 4) improves the model fit relative to the control model 
                                                 
5 The level of significance for product demand uncertainty reduced from 0.05 level to 0.10 level. Although 
this level of significance falls below the traditional levels of acceptance (0.05), the direction of the results is 
in keeping with the hypothesis. A significance level of 0.10 has been regarded as acceptable when the 
direction, not the size of the effect, is central to the purpose of the research (e.g., Fischer and Pollock, 2004; 
Cohen, 1995 and 1994).  
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(Model 1) at a significant level of 0.001, and the proportion of explained variance in the 
model (R2) increases from approximately 40% to 45%.6 
6.2.3 The Effects of Irreversibility: Hypothesis 3 
The independent effect of reversibility (or irreversibility) on the likelihood of IPO is 
reported in Model 5 of Table 20. Model 5 shows that the effect of reversibility was not 
significant. Given the nonsignificance of reversibility, further interaction tests to support 
Hypothesis 3 were not reported. This will be discussed further in Section 6.3.3.  
6.2.4  The Involvement of the Venture Capitalists: Hypothesis 4 
 Models 6–8 show the results of the interactions between uncertainty and the level of 
venture capital investments held. Model 6 shows that the interaction effect between product 
demand uncertainty and level of investments on the likelihood of IPO was positive and 
significant, but small. This implies that the higher the level of investments from venture 
capitalists (or the higher the influence of the venture capitalists), uncertainty in product 
demand will have a slightly stronger effect on the likelihood of IPO. This relationship, 
which is depicted in Figure 7, contradicts Hypothesis 4 and will be discussed in the next 
chapter.7 Model 7 shows that the interaction effect between stock return uncertainty and the 
level of investments on the likelihood of IPO is negative and significant, but small. This 
implies that if the level of investments from venture capitalists is high, uncertainty in stock 
                                                 
6 Some researchers have found curvilinear effects of uncertainty (e.g., Folta and Miller, 2004). Tests were 
conducted for product demand uncertainty and stock return uncertainty, both at the second power; however, 
no curvilinear effects with these two variables and the likelihood of IPO were found. 
 
7 According to Hypothesis 4, as venture capitalists become more involved, the relationship between product 
demand uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO will be explained by a real options reasoning approach. 
However, as shown in Figure 7, which depicts the results of the tests for Hypothesis 4, as the level of 
investment held increases, the relationship between product demand uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO 
decreases at a decreasing rate. Figure 8 shows that as the level of investment increases, the relationship 
between stock return uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO increases at a decreasing rate.  
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returns will slightly strengthen the positive relationship between stock return uncertainty 
and the likelihood of IPO. This relationship, which is depicted in Figure 8, partly supports 
Hypothesis 4 and will be discussed in the next chapter. Model 8 integrates the main and 
interaction variables of the two models, in which the significance of the product demand 
uncertainty x level of investments interaction term is maintained; however the significance 
of the stock return uncertainty x investments interaction term is weakened. The likelihood 
ratio test indicates that the addition of interaction variables (Model 8) improved the model 
fit relative to the model without the interactive terms (Model 4) at a significant level of 
0.001. 
6.2.5  The Main Effects of Competition: Hypothesis 5A-5B  
The individual effects of product market competition and competition in the IPO 
offerings market on the likelihood of IPO are shown in models 9 and 10. Model 9, which is 
depicted in Figure 9, shows that product market competition is positively related to the 
likelihood of IPO at the 0.10 significance level. This supports Hypothesis 5A that the level 
of competition in the product market will increase the likelihood of IPO. Model 10 (Figure 
10) shows that competition in the IPO offerings market is positively related to the 
likelihood of IPO with significance (p<0.05). This supports Hypothesis 5B that the level of 
competition in the stock market will increase the likelihood of IPO. 
6.2.6  The Interaction Effects of Competition: Hypothesis 6A-6B  
Models 11–13 show the results of the interactions between uncertainty and 
competition. Model 11, which is depicted in Figure 11, shows that the interaction term 
between product demand uncertainty and competition in the product market is negative and 
significant. This implies that at higher levels of competition in the product market, 
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uncertainty in the product market will reduce the likelihood of IPO. This supports 
Hypothesis 6B. Model 12 (Figure 12) shows that the interaction term between stock return 
uncertainty and competition in the IPO offerings market is positive and significant. This 
implies that at higher levels of competition in the stock market, the effect of uncertainty in 
stock returns will reinforce the likelihood of IPO. This supports Hypothesis 6B. Model 13 
integrates the interaction variables of the two models, in which the significance of the two 
interaction effects still holds. These results reinforce the notion that competition in different 
types of markets may have different effects and influence firms’ actions differently. In 
particular, in the product market where blind spots exist, firms that are able to recognize 
opportunity will gain competitive advantages. However, when the blind spots are eroded, 
any competitive advantage gained may quickly erode. 
6.2.7  Summary of IPO Likelihood Model – Continuous Time Flow (Hypotheses 1A-
6B) 
Model 14 in Table 22 shows the result of all the main variables and interactions 
variables from Hypothesis 1A to 6B. Most notable is that when compared with the control 
model (Model 1), the results show that the addition of the independent variables and 
interaction variables increased the explained variance by 8.7% (the adjusted R2 rose from 
40.8% to 49.5%). The likelihood ratio test indicates that the addition of the key variables 
and interaction variables improved the model fit relative to the base model (Model 1) at a 
significant level of 0.001. 
6.2.8  IPO Likelihood Model - Punctuated Time Flow (Hypotheses 7A-7B) 
Model 15 reports the estimation of the effects of the positive shock variables on the 
likelihood of IPO. The positive demand shock is positively and significantly related to the 
likelihood of IPO; a product demand shock increases the likelihood of IPO by 
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approximately 2%. However, the relationship between the stock market shock and the 
likelihood of IPO was not significant. These results reinforce the notion that the product 
market may be opaque and thus firms take cues from large shocks in the environment as 
cues, whereas in the stock market, where information is clear, firms monitor the market 
frequently and make decisions on a continuous basis. 
6.3  Discussion of Results 
Overall, the findings in this dissertation support most of the hypotheses. Table 23 
summarizes the hypotheses and results for the IPO likelihood model. This section analyzes 
the results in greater depth and interprets the meaning of the results.  
6.3.1  Uncertainty 
The findings in this dissertation are among the first to demonstrate empirically that 
the relationship between uncertainty and likelihood of IPO depends on the source of 
uncertainty. The results show that environmental conditions in both the product market and 
stock market influenced the likelihood that a firm will launch an IPO; however, the 
directions of the influence of the two markets were opposite. Uncertainty in the product 
market induced firms to act in accordance with the theory of real options reasoning and 
defer their IPO until product market conditions become clear, whereas uncertainty in the 
stock market induced firms to act in accordance with the theory of entrepreneurial action 
and launch their IPO when uncertainty was high. Such differences in IPO launch decisions 
may be due to the characteristics of each market, and the heuristics and biases that the 
entrepreneurs may have toward each market. The product market is characterized by 
opaqueness (Miller and Friesen, 1984); there are no clear general market indicators or 
easily obtainable information that help firms recognize and understand opportunities that 
 98
can be supported by an IPO. Thus, under highly uncertain conditions, firms will incur 
higher costs in decision making (Simon, 1979). This results in firms deferring their IPOs 
under uncertain conditions in the product market. In contrast, the stock market provides 
clearer signals, with several market indicators and information that is readily available 
through the media. Therefore opportunities in the markets that can be supported by an IPO 
are recognizable and easily understood. This results in firms launching IPOs at high levels 
of uncertainty in the stock market. 
6.3.2  The Level of Venture Capitalists Involvement 
I also attempted to demonstrate that firms respond to uncertainty differently 
depending on the level of influence that venture capitalists have in the decision making. 
However, the results were mixed; the assumption was not supported in the product market, 
but was supported in the stock market (but the effects were small). First, in general, the 
results showed that having venture capitalist backing slightly increased firms’ likelihood of 
IPO. This is likely due to venture capitalists’ ability to manage uncertainty through 
leveraging their previous experience with other high growth firms. This supports the notion 
that managers with more experience in the market will have better skills in detecting 
information that may be pertinent to reducing the overall perceptual uncertainties 
(Milliken, 1987; Jackson and Dutton, 1988; Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999). Second, the 
results showed that when venture capitalists have low levels of influence in firms, as 
uncertainty in the product market increases, firms will reduce their likelihood of IPO at an 
increasing rate. This contradicted the hypothesis that predicted that, as uncertainty 
increases, firms with low levels of influence from venture capitalists would act in 
accordance with an entrepreneurial action approach and increase their likelihood of IPO. 
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That firms with low levels of influence from venture capitalists in their decision making 
continued to act in accordance with a real options reasoning approach and decreased their 
likelihood of IPO is likely due to both the opaqueness of the product market and the lack of 
support from venture capitalists in overcoming the perceptual uncertainties in that market. 
Third, the results showed that when firms have low levels of influence from venture 
capitalists, as uncertainty in the stock market increased, firms slightly reduced their 
likelihood of IPO at a constant rate. However, the magnitude of this effect was very small. 
This is likely because the stock market is easy to interpret; therefore both entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists were aligned in their interpretation of the growth opportunities available 
through an IPO. 
6.3.3  Irreversibility 
The issue of irreversibility of IPOs has generally been ignored in both finance and 
strategy research. In this dissertation, I attempted to measure the direct and moderating 
effects of irreversibility on firms’ likelihood of launching an IPO. However, the results 
were not significant. One explanation may be my reliance on the number of LBOs/MBOs 
as the measure of irreversibility. This is because although the number of LBOs/MBOs 
indicates the infrastructure available to support a firm’s “going private,” the number of 
LBOs/MBOs may also indicate that the general environment may be more conducive to a 
firm remaining privately held. In particular, industries with many LBO/MBO occurrences 
typically go through major restructurings in order to regain the efficiency that firms had 
when they were privately held (Draho, 2004). Decision makers may deem periods with a 
large number of LBOs/MBOs in the market as a signal that it will be beneficial to remain 
private. Given the different potential framings that managers may have despite facing the 
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same phenomena (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Fiegenbaum, Hart, and Schendel, 1996), 
it is not surprising that managers may opt for different strategic directions with regards to 
their IPO launch. 
6.3.4 Competition 
The findings in this dissertation demonstrate that competition matters in IPO launch 
decisions. The results show that both competition in the product market and the IPO 
offerings market directly increased firms’ likelihood of IPO, with significance. This 
provides evidence that the IPO stage is not merely a transition that brings financial growth 
or a “cash-out” vehicle, but also a competitively induced action, and thus deserves further 
research attention in the field of entrepreneurship and strategy. 
The findings also demonstrate that the presence of competition influences how 
firms respond to the general environment. In the product market, the results show that 
under low levels of product competition, as uncertainty in the product market increased, 
firms increased their likelihood of IPO. However, when the level of product competition 
was high, as uncertainty in the product market increased, firms decreased their likelihood 
of IPO. The different effects of product market competition on how firms’ timed their IPO 
launch under different levels of product demand uncertainty is likely due to the nature of 
the product market, which is characterized with opaqueness in information and presence of 
competitive blind spots. Low levels of product competition allow firms to build their post-
IPO competitive advantages without triggering a response from rivals. However, when 
competition is high, the leakage from an IPO process will allow rivals to erode any post-
IPO competitive advantages gained. Thus, the timing of an IPO launch needs to be 
managed properly in order to yield strategic advantages for a firm.  
 101
6.3.5 Positive Shocks 
Although I hypothesized that firms may use benchmarks or long-term growth trends 
as references, and launch their IPOs when there is a high deviation from these benchmarks 
or trends, only product demand shocks increased the likelihood of IPO. Positive shock in 
the stock market did not affect the likelihood of IPO. One reason may be the nature of the 
differences between the product market and the stock markets. As product market 
conditions may not be clear and are difficult to interpret, the need to launch an IPO may 
become evident only when positive shocks occur. This supports the notions of the 
information-processing limits of decision makers (Abelson and Levi, 1985) and punctuated 
time flows (Schumpeter, 1934). In contrast, the stock market is characterized by indicators 
that are easy to understand and readily available from the media. Therefore, firms are likely 
to monitor market conditions frequently in determining their IPO launch timing and rely 
less on stock market shocks as triggers to take action. This supports the notion that firms 
follow a continuous time flow approach in making their IPO launch decisions. 
6.4  Summary 
While most of the key proposed relationships were supported, some relationships 
were not fully supported. These results offer a credible explanation for the timing of IPOs. 
The next chapter will provide further implications of this research for researchers, 







CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
 
The final chapter discusses the implications of this study, its limitations, and 
directions for future research. First, the theoretical implications and contributions are 
presented; second, the managerial implications; and third, the policy implications. The last 
section concludes the dissertation by discussing the study’s limitations and potential future 
research directions.  
7.1 Research Implications 
The dissertation provides insights into the considerations pertaining to IPO launches 
that advance concepts and theories in strategy and entrepreneurship research. Specifically, 
the dissertation (1) provides insights into decision making about IPOs, (2) reconciles 
contradictory theories within strategy and entrepreneurship, and (3) highlights the role of 
timing in strategy research.  
First, this dissertation demonstrates that strategy and entrepreneurship theories can 
be used to explain IPO timing decisions with timing measured as the likelihood of IPO. 
Previous researchers have mainly used financial theories and assumptions to explain why 
and when firms launch IPOs. This has resulted in gaps and inconsistencies between 
research expectations and the actual IPO phenomena. In particular, the integration of the 
theories and perspectives of the competitive dynamics, real options reasoning, and 
entrepreneurial actions contribute to a better understanding of IPO launch timings from a 
strategic perspective—rather than from that of an investor, which has been predominantly 
researched in the past. 
 
Second, this dissertation reconciles contradictory perspectives from the theories of 
entrepreneurial action and real options reasoning with regards to firms’ response under 
uncertain conditions. Specifically, this study found that in the product market, the 
relationship between uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO is better explained by the theory 
based on real options reasoning, whereas in the stock market, the relationship between 
uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO is better explained by the theory based on 
entrepreneurial action. The research also found that firms respond to competition 
differently; increased competition in the product market decreases firms’ likelihood of IPO 
launch, whereas increased competition in the IPO offerings market accelerates that 
likelihood.  
 Third, this dissertation highlights timing as a decision-making criterion, measured 
as the likelihood of launching an IPO, and the managerial heuristics used in determining 
IPO launch timings. Despite efforts to encourage studies on timing (e.g., Bluedorn and 
Denhardt, 1988; Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Special Issue 1998; Academy of 
Management Review, Special Issue 2001), relatively little research has been done on 
timing as a decision criterion. Much of the research that incorporates timing into action is 
grounded in the logic that time is “linear and scarce, and faster is better” (Bird and West, 
1998). This research demonstrates that firms consider timing to be important in their 
decision making and recognize the strategic value of deferral; when faced with uncertainty 
in the product market, firms delay their action or take action when conditions become 
clearer. This research also integrates theories on managerial heuristics and demonstrates 
that when clear indicators on the value of their actions are lacking, firms use environmental 
cues and signals to determine the timing of their actions. Specifically, the research found 
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that in the product market where no clear indicators exist, firms take a punctuated 
equilibrium approach, whereas in the stock market where clear indicators exist, firms make 
decisions based on a continuous time flow. 
7.2 Managerial Implications 
This dissertation offers several contributions to managerial practice that 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists may wish to consider. The insights pertain to (1) the 
management of firm growth through IPOs with respect to uncertain environments, (2) the 
factors that may indicate the potential strategic advantages and disadvantages of early IPO 
timings, and (3) the importance of information and knowledge on the state of the general 
environment. These contributions are discussed below. 
First, the research provides insights into how firms vary their IPO timing in order to 
grow. Recent articles and books have discussed the importance of considering an IPO as a 
growth vehicle as opposed to being used for purely financial purposes (e.g., Champion, 
2001; Garnsey, 2002:119). However, there has been less focus on what kinds of indicators 
managers use to assess growth opportunities available through an IPO and, more 
importantly, how managers react to these indicators. This research shows that managers act 
in accordance with the theory of real options approach with respect to uncertainty in the 
product market. Although such action allows firms to avoid risky outcomes, it also entails 
foregoing growth opportunities inherent in the market. This research also shows that 
managers act in accordance with the theory of entrepreneurial action with respect to 
uncertainty in the stock market. However, by doing so, firms compete against rivals for 
opportunities inherent in the market that are easy to recognize and understand. Thus, more 
 105
emphasis on recognizing and understanding the opportunities inherent in the product 
market can provide firms with unique opportunities for growth against competition. 
Second, this research provides managers with a better understanding of the strategic 
advantages and disadvantages that firms may consider in timing an IPO launch. While 
managers may face pressure for early IPO launches—both from investors who seek early 
returns and due to threats from rivals who seek capital from the stock market—under some 
circumstances there are several strategic advantages to deferring IPOs. For example, when 
product market conditions are uncertain, firms that defer their IPO gain the opportunity to 
learn more about the appropriate course of action and can then be more efficient in 
production, staffing, sales, and marketing when they launch an IPO. These actions are 
likely to have positive long-term consequences for firm growth. By rushing an IPO launch, 
despite satisfying investors, a firm may deploy resources inefficiently, which may hamper 
its growth. Another example is that when uncertainty is high and competition is stiff in the 
product market, a firm launching an IPO provides other firms with information about its 
strategy and tactics. The availability of such information may quickly diminish any 
advantages the firm may have sought through an IPO. Thus, by deferring an IPO launch, 
firms may be able to better gauge rivals’ strategies and tactics and counteract them. 
However, these notions need to be confirmed through further testing. 
A third contribution this research makes to management practice involves the 
recognition of opportunities under uncertain conditions. The findings suggest that 
individuals react differently to different sources of uncertainty. The difference may be due 
to their difficulty in understanding the growth opportunities inherent in the product market. 
If so, this suggests that increased focus on opportunity recognition skills in the product 
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market may provide managers with advantage over rivals in achieving firm growth. 
Advantages may be gained in several ways. One way is for firms to engage managerial 
teams with varied backgrounds to interpret and determine the opportunities in the product 
market. This is because managers with varied backgrounds pay attention to different 
segments of the environment that affect the type and depth of information that can be used 
for determining the opportunities available to a firm (Dutton and Duncan, 1987). Another 
way is for firms to engage individuals experienced in interpreting product market 
conditions, such as venture capitalists and consultants, to support their recognition of 
opportunities. This is because individuals who are very familiar with the external 
environment will have better scanning and opportunity recognition abilities (Barringer and 
Bluedorn, 1999). 
7.3 Policy Implications 
This research also has policy implications. Traditional entrepreneurship policies 
have been directed to the goal of creating local jobs; as a result, these policies have mainly 
focused on incentives for business recruitment and retention within local economies. There 
has been less focus on business education for entrepreneurial growth, in particular, to 
enhance the abilities of entrepreneurs who have already started firms to recognize 
opportunities. By supporting opportunity recognition skills among firms that are 
established and are contemplating further growth through an IPO, local governments can 
provide firms with effective tools to strengthen their competitive advantage within both the 
local and the broader economy. This is because firms that can recognize opportunities 
inherent in the product market will be able to take advantage of them and gain competitive 
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advantages over their rivals. This in turn will strengthen the overall economic base within 
the local economy.  
Local governments could help firms enhance their opportunity recognition skills in 
many ways. Local governments could catalyze the supply of relevant market information 
and support from private service providers to local entrepreneurs. The presence of mentors, 
access to networks of qualified service providers, and participation in professional forums 
can help entrepreneurs enhance their opportunity recognition skills (Ozgen and Baron, 
2004). Thus, by helping entrepreneurs to have access to relevant information and services, 
local governments could support firms in determining their IPO launch decision based on 
entrepreneurial activities. 
Another way local governments could assist is by supporting entrepreneurship 
education to enhance opportunity recognition skills, which can be enhanced through 
effective training (Baron, 2006; National Commission on Entrepreneurship, 2001). Such 
training could include activities such as college-level courses or business plan 
competitions. By using local education systems to nurture future entrepreneurs through 
entrepreneurship courses and activities, local governments may be able to support firms to 
effectively time their IPO launch. 
7.4 Limitations and Future Research Directions  
The study for this dissertation developed and tested hypotheses about how 
entrepreneurs manage their firm growth through the timing of their IPO launch. However, 
as with any research, this dissertation has some limitations that are important to 
acknowledge. These limitations, along with the results of this dissertation, suggest several 
directions for future research. 
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First, I did not distinguish whether the venture capitalists involved were generalists 
or specialists. Further research is needed to determine how firms associated with different 
types of venture capitalists respond differently to various types of uncertainties and 
competition. In determining the timing of the IPO, I expect that firms that have specialist 
venture capitalists are likely to have a better understanding of and greater sensitivity to the 
uncertainty factors in the stock market and competition within the IPO offerings market. 
Venture capitalists that specialize in certain industries are more likely to have expertise in 
the industry of the firm and have greater knowledge from previous investments on firm 
growth. Thus, they are likely to be better able to detect the optimal IPO timing based on the 
product market trends. This is consistent with the notion that firms in specific industries are 
more likely to sense competitors' actions within the same industry (Smith, Grimm, Gannon, 
and Chen, 1991) and that decision makers with diverse skills and orientations are better 
equipped to make sense of environmental complexity and change (Bantel and Jackson, 
1989; Dutton and Duncan, 1987).  
Second, this research did not consider competing hazards that may have arisen 
during the sample period (i.e., the possibility that firms may select an action other than an 
IPO launch). As this research focused on firm growth, any buy-outs or mergers that 
occurred were considered as drop outs and were right-censored. However, uncertainty in 
the general environment and certain strategic considerations could induce entrepreneurs to 
sell their firm or merge their firm with a partner rather than launch an IPO. More research 
is needed to understand how competing hazards such mergers and acquisitions and buy-
outs may affect the likelihood of an IPO launch. 
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Third, although this research sheds some light on the strategic considerations that 
influence the consequence of IPO choice and timing, it does not address the resultant firm 
growth performance after the IPO. Traditionally, IPO success has been measured by the 
amount of capital firms were able to raise through the IPO (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati 
and Higgins, 2003). However, anecdotal evidence suggests that a large number of firms 
that have acquired capital resources through an IPO launch do not perform well with 
regards to sales growth post-IPO. Only 70–75% of IPO firms survive the first five years 
after the IPO (Jain and Kini, 2000; Fischer and Pollock, 2004). Therefore, it is important to 
extend this research to examine how the timing of the IPO launch with regards to strategic 
considerations in the market actually transforms into firm growth, in order to respond to 
queries such as: Do early IPO timings under high levels of competition provide better 
growth opportunities? Or do later timings provide better growth opportunities? 
In this research, I hypothesized that firms would consider their strategic 
considerations based on the general environment when determining their IPO launch. I did 
not elaborate on internal factors in the models (e.g., the age of the firm, the age of the 
venture capitalist, as well as the cumulative amount of investment capital held by the firm). 
However, to extend this research in order to examine how strategic considerations in IPO 
launch timing actually translates to post-IPO firm growth, both the general environment 
and internal environment must be considered. Whether firms are able to leverage their IPO 
timing choice based on strategic considerations in the general environment and translate it 
to their advantage will likely hinge on the firms’ ability to effectively transform the capital 
acquired through the IPO into growth-enhancing absorbed slack. This is in accordance with 
the Penrose (1959) theory of the growth of the firm, in which resources become dynamic 
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capabilities when they are actively deployed. Firms that launch their IPO early due to 
strategic considerations in the general environment, but are ineffective in transforming their 
acquired capital to growth enhancing absorbed slack, may actually support rivals by 
providing them with better advantages in both the product market and stock market.  
For example, in the product market, early IPO-launchers must be able to convert 
their acquired capital into research and development activities, production facilities, or 
marketing activities and gain market share with speed and efficiency. Otherwise, any 
benefits sought from an early IPO launch are likely to be diminished—early IPO launchers 
will give proprietary information and potential market share to rivals with better 
capabilities and greater efficiency in using capital resources. Under such conditions, 
despite the strategic advantages of early moves based on the general environment, the 
internal environment of a firm may provide reasons for it to defer an IPO launch. Further 
research is needed to determine how the general environment (both the product market and 
stock market conditions) interact with a firm’s internal environment to determine the 
optimal IPO launch timing and the resultant post-IPO firm growth. 
Fourth, there are some limitations in the research methodology that could be 
modified. For the dependent variable, I used the likelihood of IPO to measure the timing of 
a firm’s IPO launch. However, other methods could be explored, such as the actual timing 
from the firm’s founding or from when it gained venture capital backing to the IPO launch 
date. For the sampling time frame, I only sampled firms that were founded during 1980–
1996 and censored the analysis at 1996. However, with increased information, the 
relationship between several time varying covariates and the likelihood of IPO could be 
tested beyond 1996. 
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Fifth, I only examined the likelihood of IPOs among entrepreneurial firms. 
However, there are other firms besides entrepreneurial firms that also launch IPOs. These 
firms include subsidiaries, spin-offs, or firms that have been long established. Studying 
such firms could provide a comprehensive understanding of when and why firms go public. 
Lastly, this research empirically examines the theories derived from real options 
reasoning from the organizational decision maker’s perspective, but, similar to other 
research on decision making and option reasoning, does not incorporate the decision 
making and/or potential use of the real option reasoning of other related constituents: the 
investors, venture capitalists, and investment bankers. They are likely to perceive 
uncertainty differently, and thereby recognize options differently. This is because an IPO 
normally comes only once in a firm’s life course, and thus entrepreneurs are likely to lack 
experience in this important firm transformation. Venture capitalists’ and investors’ 
portfolios are likely to have numerous examples of IPO investments. This is consistent with 
the literature on environmental scanning in which those who have acted entrepreneurially 
in the past will posses better environmental scanning abilities than those who have not 
(McMullen and Shepherd, 2005). How the interplay of different constituents with different 
values of option reasoning contributes to the IPO timing deserves further research 
attention. 
In summary, this dissertation highlights how firms use strategic considerations in 
managing the timing of their IPO to achieve growth. The results are consistent with the 
notion that IPOs have strategic implications and that the product market plays an important 
role in determining the IPO launch timing. While this research has provided insights into 
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the factors that determine IPO timings, much remains to be explained. Many opportunities 
exist to replicate and expand this study. 
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Table 1. Summary of the IPOs in the Entrepreneurship Literature 
Aspect Theoretical / 
Empirical Model 
IPO Aspect 
Life cycle Prasad, Vozikis, Burton, 
and Meriken (1996) 
 




IPOs are regarded as “harvesting of 
crops.” 
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Table 3. Summary of IPOs in the Finance Literature—Financial Benefits 
 
Aspect Theoretical / 
Empirical Model 




Myers and Majluf (1984) 





IPOs can reduce information asymmetries 
between firms and financial providers, as 
well as allow firms to take advantage of 
favorable conditions.  
 
IPOs allow firms to overcome resource 





Bhattacharya and Ritter 
(1983) 




Booth and Chua (1996) 
Pagano and Röell (1998) 
Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales (1998) 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1999) 
 
IPOs allow firms to obtain direct financing 
at lower cost by signaling their 
competencies, reducing their dependence 
on banks, or increase their bargaining 




Loughran, Ritter, and 
Rydqvist (1994) 
Zingales (1995) 
Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales (1998) 
Mello and Parsons (1998) 
Black and Gilson (1998) 
Stoughton and Zechner 
(1998) 
 
IPOs provide cash-out/exit opportunities 




Table 4. Summary of IPOs in the Finance Literature—Managerial Benefits 
 
Aspect Theoretical / Empirical 
Model 





Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1993) 
Burkart, Gromb and 
Panunzi (1997) 
 






Pagano and Röell (1998) 
 
IPOs enhance firm performance through 




IPOs eliminate problems with excessive 
monitoring by allowing the firm to 
establish a dispersed shareholder base of 
atomistic shareholders who do not 
monitor. 
 
IPOs increase public monitoring of firms, 
forcing firms to engage in activities that 










Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) 
Maskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) 
IPOs provide firms with essential 
information as stock market traders may 
have important information that managers 
do not have about the value of 
prospective investment opportunities. 
 
Firms that undergo an IPO will make 
more effective decisions as private 




Maksimovic and Titman 
(1991) 
Rydqvist and Hogholm 
(1995) 
Pagano, Röell, and 
Zechner (2002) 
Ravasi and Marchisio 
(2003) 
Demers and Lewellen 
(2003) 
IPOs enhance the visibility of firms. 
Legitimacy Marchisio and Ravasi 
(2001) 
Ritter and Welch (2002) 
 
IPOs instill confidence in investors, 






Mello and Parsons (1998) 
IPOs make it easier for a potential 




Stoughton and Zechner 
(1998) 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1999) 
Riskier firms can decrease the holding of 





Table 5. Summary of IPOs in the Finance Literature—Competitive Benefits 
 
Aspect Theoretical / Empirical 
Model 





Long, Wald, and Zhang 
(2003) 
 








Stoughton, Wong, and 
Zechner (1999) 
IPOs allow firms to acquire limited 
resources necessary for market 
expansion. 
 
Firms in high growth industries or small 
differences in productivity are likely to go 





Booth and Chua (1996) 









Perotti and Von Thadden 
(2003) 
Companies in which firm-specific 
information is important are less likely to 





Firms in industries that are established or 
have high ratios of listed firms are likely to 
launch an IPO. 
 
High quality firms will face less 




Brander and Lewis (1986) 
Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990) 
Phillips and Kovenock 
(1997) 
Khanna and Tice (2000) 
 
Kanatas and Qi (2001) 
Telser (1996) 
Bolton and Scharfstein 
(199) 




IPOs reduce leverage allowing firms to 







Eliminates rivals’ aggressive behavior 
















Small firms with low 
levels of VC 




Avoidance of large actions 
under unclear information
LowFirms with high levels 
of VC involvement / 
more rationality in their 
IPO decisions
Irreversibility Real options 
reasoning
Avoidance of action under 
unclear information that 
cannot be reversed
LowFirms undertaking large 
commitments under 
real options reasoning 
approach
Competition Reactive Defense of resource 
platform and opportunities 
in the market
Presence of blind spots





Avoidance of rivalry in 
acquisition of resources 
and opportunities in the 
market
Lack of blind spots 
LowFirms that face low 
competition or firms 




IPOs brings about 
resources that can 
support growth derived 
from opportunities 
inherent in the market
IPOs under uncertainty 
can bring about large 
opportunity costs that 
may deter firm growth
Irreversibility increases 
the negative effects of 
uncertainty on IPO
IPOs support firms in 
early movers 
advantage in resource 
acquisition
IPOs may be place firms 
at a disadvantage due to 
the potential leakage of 
information in the IPO 
launch 

































• Product demand 
uncertainty
• Stock return uncertainty
• Sudden large increases in 
product demand 
• Sudden large increases in 
stock returns
Source factors
• Value of IPO launch based 
on entrepreneurial 
opportunities, deferral 
options, and competitive 
dynamics
• Value of difference between  
sudden shocks and 





• Real options reasoning
• VC involvement
• Decision making biases, 















 Table 8. Summary of Relationships and Hypotheses 
 
Relationships Between Variables 
 Independent  Moderator Dependent 
Hypotheses 
Product demand 
uncertainty H1A: High uncertainty in product demand will increase the likelihood of IPO launch. 
Stock return 
uncertainty H1B: High uncertainty in stock returns will increase the likelihood of IPO launch. 
Product demand 




H2B: High uncertainty in stock returns will decrease 
the likelihood of IPO launch.  
Product demand 
uncertainty H3A: High levels of irreversibility will increase the negative relationship between product demand 








 H3B: High levels of irreversibility will increase the 
negative relationship between stock return 










H4:   Uncertainty will positively influence the 
likelihood of IPO when firms have low levels of 
involvement from VCs and negatively influence 
the likelihood of IPO when firms have high 
levels of involvement from VCs in their decision 
making. 
Product market 





H5B: High levels of competition in the IPO offerings 





competition H6A: The higher the level of product market competition, the level of product demand 
uncertainty will have a stronger negative effect 







H6B: The higher the level of competition in the IPO 
offerings market, the level of stock uncertainty 
will have a stronger positive effect on the 
likelihood of IPO launch. 
Product demand 



























H7B: The higher the increase in stock market return 
trends, the higher the likelihood of IPO launch. 
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Table 9. Industry Description 
 




Food and kindred products 
Malt beverages, wines and liquor, soft 










Industrial machinery and equipment 
Steam, gas, and hydraulic turbines  
Construction machinery, elevators and moving 
stairways, trucks and tractors  
Machine tools, dies and power-driven 
handtools  
Pumps and compressors  
Computers  
Vending machines, air-conditioning and 
heating equipment, service industry machinery 
Carburetors, pistons, and valves 
25 
259 
Furniture and fixtures 






 Electrical and electronic equipment 
Motors and generators, electrical industrial 
apparatus  
Household audio and video equipment  
Electron tubes and semiconductors  








Chemicals and allied products 
Plastics and synthetic resins, organic fibers 
Medicinal chemicals and botanical products, 
pharmaceutical products 
Gum and wood chemicals 
Fertilizers  
Adhesives and sealants, explosives, and 







 Instruments and related products 
Laboratory apparatus and furniture, 
instruments for measuring and testing of 
electricity, laboratory analytical instruments, 
optical instruments and lenses 
Medical instruments and apparatus, dental 
equipment and supplies , X-ray and 
electromedical apparatus  
Ophthalmic goods 
Photographic equipment and supplies 
32 
325 
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 
Brick and structural clay tile, ceramic wall 




 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
Musical Instruments 





Primary metal industries 
Secondary smelting and refining of 
nonferrous metals 
Rolling, drawing, and extruding of copper, 
aluminum sheet, plate, and foil 
  
 





 Table 10. Firm Descriptive Statistics I 
 
SIC Total IPO Dropped Censured Total IPO Dropped Censured Total IPO Dropped Censured
208 39     9     7       23      13     2      4       7       26     7     3       16      
209 76     9     26      41     25   4    11    10      51   5   15    31    
259 13     5     1       7      2    1    -   1       11   4   1     6     
282 23     3     8       12     8    1    2     5       15   2   6     7     
283 445    236   94      115    264  164  61    39      181  72  33    76    
286 32     11    7       14     20   7    5     8       12   4   2     6     
287 7      4     2       1      2    2    -   -     5    2   2     1     
289 6      3     2       1      4    2    1     1       2    1   1     -   
299 1      -   1       -    -  -  -   -     1    - 1     -   
325 15     3     3       9      10   3    2     5       5    - 1     4     
334 28     10    8       10     13   5    5     3       15   5   3     7     
335 42     14    11      17     12   6    4     2       30   8   7     15    
351 2      1     -     1      1    1    -   -     1    - -   1     
353 37     3     12      22     10   -  3     7       27   3   9     15    
354 39     3     9       27     7    -  1     6       32   3   8     21    
355 1      -   1       -    1    -  1     -     -  - -   -   
356 41     5     13      23     12   2    3     7       29   3   10    16    
357 372    107   126     139    222  76   87    59      150  31  39    80    
358 68     11    22      35     23   5    10    8       45   6   12    27    
359 64     7     13      44     16   2    5     9       48   5   8     35    
362 21     6     4       11     10   4    1     5       11   2   3     6     
365 19     8     8       3      5    -  5     -     14   8   3     3     
367 366    129   117     120    192  82   68    42      174  47  49    78    
369 66     14    17      35     30   9    13    8       36   5   4     27    
382 173    31    57      85     94   20   39    35      79   11  18    50    
384 505    179   136     190    280  122  84    74      225  57  52    116   
385 21     6     6       9      7    4    2     1       14   2   4     8     
386 2      2     -     -    1    1    -   -     1    1   -   -   
393 10     3     3       4      4    2    -   2       6    1   3     2     
399 105    7     27      71     17   1    6     10      88   6   21    61    
Total  2,639  829   741     1,069   1,305  528    423     354     1,334  301   318     715     





Table 11. Firm Descriptive Statistics II 
 
SIC N Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean
208 9 1.00 14.58 6.36 18.6 22.4 20.5 0 31,129 1,447 0 4,870 545
209 9 0.00 14.92 4.86 9.9 36.9 20.2 0 114,928 4,968 0 51,992 7,158
259 5 0.00 7.92 4.62 10.4 10.4 10.4 0 80,630 3,774 0 80,630 16,126
282 3 0.83 5.50 2.75 26.9 26.9 26.9 0 15,950 589 0 1,750 583
283 236 0.00 16.42 4.72 3.7 40.7 17.0 0 389,959 5,076 0 172,096 11,748
286 11 1.25 13.92 6.21 8.0 24.2 16.6 0 23,530 2,940 0 19,350 7,393
287 4 1.42 10.08 6.81 5.4 22.1 13.8 0 15,364 974 0 15,364 6,929
289 3 1.58 9.33 6.19 21.9 23.9 22.9 0 23,085 5,953 0 23,085 13,326
299 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
325 3 3.08 10.17 6.78 12.1 27.5 19.0 0 17,464 3,125 5,651 17,464 12,305
334 10 0.75 9.17 4.93 16.8 34.7 23.9 0 260,462 7,246 0 260,462 30,728
335 14 0.67 14.50 5.30 1.0 52.7 20.7 0 77,199 3,891 0 67,595 10,931
351 1 7.67 7.67 7.67 23.9 23.9 23.9 0 7,574 1,795 7,574 7,574 7,574
353 3 0.17 7.00 3.86   0.0 0.0 0.0 0 14,572 1,716 0 0 0
354 3 1.75 16.92 7.53 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 26,800 709 0 0 0
355 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 8,800 8,800 8,800 0 0 0
356 5 2.42 13.08 6.80 16.8 30.1 23.4 0 10400 552 0 1,450 463
357 107 0.00 16.92 5.18 0.0 40.6 15.8 0 145,000 4,900 0 145,000 14,640
358 11 1.42 8.50 4.19 8.2 29.4 17.0 0 17,033 1,316 0 14,001 4,387
359 7 0.58 9.83 3.32 8.8 13.3 11.1 0 40,088 982 0 24,840 3,763
362 6 1.33 10.00 5.50 10.4 22.3 17.9 0 26,500 3,534 0 26,500 7,020
365 8 2.58 14.92 5.60 13.6 32.4 22.5 0 16,000 1,410 0 16,000 2,916
367 129 0.00 15.00 6.26 3.1 52.1 21.4 0 5,469 0 0 120,000 11,872
369 14 0.25 13.75 5.66 8.3 29.1 20.0 0 148,926 2,371 0 58,275 8,895
382 31 0.33 13.67 6.47 5.3 39.8 22.0 0 43,631 3,236 0 25,486 7,823
384 179 0.17 15.50 5.27 0.0 51.2 18.7 0 304,000 4,437 0 146,289 10,034
385 6 1.50 12.92 7.31 9.3 25.3 20.4 0 30,700 1,667 0 30,700 8,338
386 2 2.50 3.75 3.13 18.5 18.5 18.5 0 13,300 2,236 0 13,300 6,650
393 3 2.17 3.50 2.66 10.6 12.3 11.4 0 7,730 1,165 0 7,730 4,895
399 7 0.50 12.83 4.23 7.7 7.7 7.7 0 61,500 1,277 0 1,210 173
Summary 829    0.00 16.92 5.01 0.00 52.70 16.12 0 389,959 2,736 0 260,462 7,241
 Ave. VC Age at IPO 
(years)
Total Ave. Investments 
Held at IPO ($000)  
  Ave. Investments Held 
($000)  
Ave. Firm Age at IPO 
(years)
 
 Table 12. Industry Descriptive Statistics: Level of Uncertainty 
 
SIC  N Min Max Std Dev Mean Min Max Std Dev Mean
208 204 0.111 0.991 0.302 0.386 0.384 0.881 0.112 0.492 22.03 **
209 204 0.000 0.404 0.153 0.203 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 358.97 **
259 204 0.000 0.272 0.081 0.032 0.000 0.808 0.237 0.082 8.11 **
282 192 0.000 0.662 0.173 0.136 0.000 0.886 0.418 0.533 184.15 **
283 204 0.000 0.586 0.178 0.134 0.723 0.813 0.024 0.760 381.46 **
286 195 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.526 0.915 0.030 0.555 2469.76 **
287 173 0.000 0.528 0.196 0.168 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 114.18 **
289 204 0.171 0.915 0.247 0.453 0.677 0.808 0.044 0.759 114.18 **
325 192 0.000 0.463 0.180 0.183 0.000 0.535 0.245 0.244 17.31 **
334 192 0.000 0.864 0.339 0.394 0.000 0.901 0.437 0.522 10.66 **
335 204 0.000 0.863 0.388 0.419 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 237.72 **
351 132 0.000 0.925 0.346 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 103.05 **
353 204 0.000 0.067 0.021 0.013 0.000 0.853 0.394 0.468 103.05 **
354 204 0.000 0.701 0.205 0.351 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 599.76 **
356 204 0.000 0.931 0.327 0.286 0.000 0.925 0.417 0.280 0.03
357 204 0.000 0.959 0.344 0.209 0.000 0.763 0.173 0.045 36.74 **
358 204 0.139 0.917 0.264 0.370 0.000 0.922 0.443 0.511 15.22 **
359 204 0.000 0.302 0.123 0.112 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 170.50 **
362 203 0.000 0.974 0.257 0.099 0.596 0.732 0.025 0.671 1005.44 **
365 201 0.000 0.999 0.365 0.685 0.000 0.473 0.075 0.360 161.93 **
367 204 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.822 0.272 0.104 29.59 **
369 204 0.000 0.274 0.089 0.048 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 57.41 **
382 204 0.000 0.052 0.012 0.005 0.000 0.915 0.091 0.017 3.74
384 204 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.666 0.256 0.350 381.46 **
385 169 0.000 0.930 0.362 0.264 0.000 0.106 0.015 0.007 164.82 **
386 77 0.000 0.298 0.114 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 201.73 **
393 173 0.000 0.678 0.235 0.434 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 531.78 **
399 192 0.000 0.983 0.414 0.554 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 311.40 **





Note: N=No. of month periods for level of uncertainty measures from the GARCH model used in the likelihood of IPO 
model. The uncertainty measures depict the conditional variances of the product market demand or stock returns in 
each industry at the SIC 3-digit level. Values of zero or close to zero depict very low levels of uncertainty or 
conditions and outcomes that can be predicted from previous trends in the past. Values of one or close to one depict 







 Table 13. Industry Descriptive Statistics: Competition and Reversibility 
 
No. of 
SIC  N  Min  Max Std Dev  Mean Min Max Std Dev Mean LBOs/MBOs
208 204 0.822 0.894 0.022 0.844 0 16 4.2 5.3 23
209 204 0.566 0.723 0.051 0.653 0 16 4.2 5.3 13
259 204 0.181 0.574 0.116 0.325 0 7 1.8 1.4 4
282 192 0.560 0.796 0.064 0.672 6 53 14.0 24.6 17
283 204 0.935 0.954 0.006 0.944 6 53 14.2 23.7 16
286 195 0.751 0.905 0.054 0.843 6 53 14.1 24.4 10
287 173 0.654 0.907 0.082 0.819 6 53 14.1 26.0 8
289 204 0.808 0.898 0.034 0.852 6 53 14.2 23.7 19
325 192 0.395 0.734 0.087 0.605 0 4 1.3 1.4 3
334 192 0.005 0.603 0.170 0.342 0 14 3.8 3.8 4
335 204 0.727 0.856 0.034 0.781 0 14 3.7 3.7 17
351 132 0.718 0.800 0.024 0.777 10 39 10.2 24.7 2
353 204 0.791 0.869 0.022 0.819 10 80 16.0 29.2 18
354 204 0.814 0.912 0.031 0.861 10 80 16.0 29.2 23
356 204 0.613 0.862 0.082 0.734 10 80 16.0 29.2 27
357 204 0.871 0.925 0.013 0.893 10 80 16.0 29.2 31
358 204 0.544 0.867 0.096 0.722 10 80 16.0 29.2 23
359 204 0.538 0.812 0.075 0.691 10 80 16.0 29.2 10
362 203 0.339 0.674 0.095 0.487 7 77 19.5 31.0 17
365 201 0.411 0.798 0.119 0.651 7 77 19.6 31.1 7
367 204 0.849 0.936 0.027 0.911 7 77 19.5 30.9 47
369 204 0.574 0.911 0.110 0.785 7 77 19.5 30.9 9
382 204 0.851 0.940 0.026 0.891 11 66 16.3 27.6 32
384 204 0.847 0.957 0.030 0.898 11 66 16.3 27.6 39
385 169 0.278 0.772 0.150 0.560 11 66 17.1 28.5 6
386 77 0.645 0.756 0.037 0.697 11 66 20.5 35.3 6
393 173 0.000 0.492 0.215 0.189 0 12 3.8 5.3 5
399 192 0.406 0.875 0.180 0.716 0 12 3.9 5.4 9
Product Market Competition  Stock Market Competition
 
 
Note:   
1. N=No. of months  
2. Product market competition depicts the Blau Index (1-Herfindahl Index) at the 3-digit SIC code. 
3. Stock market competition depicts the number of IPO offerings that occurred during each year period at the 2-digit SIC 
code.  
4. The no. of leverage buy-outs (LBOs)/management buy-outs (MBOs) depicts the number of leverage buyouts or 









SIC N Min Max Std Dev
Table 14. Industry Descriptive Statistics: Market-to-Book Ratio and Book Value of  
Debt 
 
Mean Min Max Std Dev  Mean
208 204 1.132 9.514 2.067 3.628 191.786      1,397.462   305.388       730.530      
209 204 1.531 5.866 1.101 3.134 15.284        110.726      28.021         47.445        
259 204 0.485 4.131 0.758 1.559 9.564          96.135       26.443         49.952        
282 192 1.011 5.117 0.992 2.748 541.708      1,321.728   243.161       816.814      
283 204 0.691 3.673 0.762 1.867 95.988        278.222      58.456         168.266      
286 195 1.880 6.399 1.278 3.850 327.680      839.907      171.807       596.571      
287 173 0.737 3.187 0.729 1.981 60.426        344.383      72.255         213.453      
289 204 1.032 3.841 0.608 2.073 62.595        208.286      50.803         122.563      
325 192 1.197 3.454 0.613 2.209 19.418        139.454      30.677         51.007        
334 192 25.028        
335 204 320.399      
351 132 194.489      
353 204 281.817      
354 204 175.120      
356 204 200.892      
357 204 392.913      
358 204 76.409        
359 204 16.708        
362 203 58.705        
365 201 683.715      
367 204 50.261        
369 204 44.421        
382 204 35.592        
384 204 51.124        
385 169 47.926        
386 482.636      
393 173 31.752        
399 192 55.211        
Market-to-Book Ratio Total Book Value of Debt (US$mn)
0.661 2.914 0.420 1.232 8.414          82.604       20.420         
0.361 3.660 0.901 1.568 170.576      518.975      104.646       
0.620 2.283 0.367 1.197 121.718      318.702      66.203         
0.807 2.609 0.393 1.583 110.635      524.320      164.960       
0.890 2.977 0.525 1.662 35.224        354.672      129.454       
0.951 2.702 0.431 1.710 103.054      394.025      117.766       
0.673 3.909 0.574 1.346 113.702      885.289      280.010       
1.411 4.137 0.511 2.080 46.917        190.185      42.180         
0.718 2.686 0.459 1.536 2.653          31.636       10.414         
0.541 3.534 0.640 1.870 18.998        135.194      30.873         
1.000 3.070 0.533 1.848 135.042      1,330.955   458.507       
1.161 2.879 0.369 1.730 21.761        90.628       21.071         
1.503 3.861 0.507 2.394 23.267        97.422       23.585         
1.213 3.278 0.477 1.996 19.364        65.842       13.579         
1.369 4.533 0.818 2.386 28.657        72.146       14.609         
0.998 7.641 1.503 2.916 3.365          141.374      49.049         
77 1.369 4.825 1.026 2.231 50.002        1,203.482   432.499       
0.507 3.066 0.491 1.059 0.248          93.296       31.561         









Table 15. Overall Descriptive Statistics for All Industries 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Firm Age 211,627    1.142        1.0723        -2.4849 2.8283
VC Age 211,627    1.065        1.3720        -5.6204 3.9646
MB Ratio 211,627    0.647        1.1399        -1.5832 7.5690
Investments 211,627    3,772      12,221      0 389,959
Bank Debt 211,627    -322.09 159.5       -516.2 2,656.0
Product demand uncertainty 211,627    0.112      0.2437      -0.2251 0.7737
Stock return uncertainty 211,627    0.061      0.3261      -0.2048 0.7201
Reverrsibility 211,627    0.109      0.2932      -0.9300 2.0702
Product market competition 211,627    0.170      0.1216      -0.6804 0.2768
Stock market competition 211,627    15.292     16.8296     -8.8852 70.1148
Product demand shock 211,627    1.311      0.1342      0 30.6874
Stock market shock 211,627    3.055      4.0144      0 1.2169
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Note: The results show mean-centered variables for industry-wide time varying covariates: product demand uncertainty, stock return uncertainty, reversibility, product market 
competition, and competition in the IPO offerings market (or stock market competition). All centering for industry-wide time varying covariates were conducted prior to 
constructing the database model across the 204-month time period. This was conducted in order to avoid bias that may come from having an unbalanced number of observations in 
any particular period. For this reason, variables such as Firm Age, VC Age, and Investments were not centered, as they exist only in the database model across the 204-month 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Product demand uncertainty 1
2 Stock return uncertainty 0.02538 1
3 Reversibility -0.01743 -0.05659 1
4 Product market competition -0.25234 0.07536 -0.07297 1
5 Stock market competition -0.09949 0.16087 -0.11389 0.25375 1
6 Product demand shock -0.23695 -0.10089 -0.01809 0.25133 0.05731 1
7 Stock market shock 0.01199 -0.01499 0.02124 -0.03952 0.25939 -0.06444 1
8 Firm Age -0.09243 -0.09141 0.11454 0.03694 -0.00653 0.09858 0.05075 1
9 VC Age -0.10691 0.00631 0.02750 0.09916 0.02162 0.09421 -0.01735 0.27458 1
10 Investments -0.05488 0.00195 0.01882 0.05657 0.02851 0.05613 -0.0059 0.9810 0.38942 1
11 MB Ratio -0.09721 0.34522 0.11589 0.27517 0.26074 -0.09088 0.37869 0.09875 0.04084 0.06652 1
12 Debt Level -0.05907 0.07605 0.13227 -0.15916 -0.06281 0.04094 0.06406 0.19457 0.0407 0.02875 0.27781 1
 









Table 17. Variance Inflation Tests  
                   
Standard 
Error t-value Pr > |t|
Variance 
Inflation
Intercept  198967 2.12447 93654.6 <.0001 0
Product demand uncertainty -201.52071 2.88188 -69.93 <.0001 1.13088
Stock return uncertainty -232.36304 2.28220 -101.82 <.0001 1.28739
Reversibility 56.18385 2.56214 21.93 <.0001 1.09226
Product market competition -168.61525 6.27866 -26.86 <.0001 1.44118
Stock market competition 2.17392 0.04402 49.38 <.0001 1.20941
Product demand shock -137.92752 5.68844 -24.25 <.0001 1.32854
Stock market shock 6.56305 0.17839 36.79 <.0001 1.17574
Firm Age 112.97152 0.66769 169.2 <.0001 1.17501
VC Age -10.76991 0.54068 -19.92 <.0001 1.27202
Investments 0.00058274 0.00006 10.49 <.0001 1.17211
MB Ratio 151.20571 0.75484 200.31 <.0001 1.84480
Debt Level 0.67507 0.00461 146.41 <.0001 1.25607  
 
 Table 18. Collinearity Diagnostics  
 
Eigen- Condition Firm MB Bank
value Index Intercept P-Uncer S-Uncer Revers P-Comp S-Comp P-Shock S-Shock Age VC Age Invest Ratio Debt
1 5.9984 1.0000 0.0023 0.0058 0.0003 0.0034 0.0050 0.0072 0.0068 0.0061 0.0068 0.0068 0.0034 0.0044 0.0032
2 1.2970 2.1506 0.0002 0.0088 0.3163 0.0001 0.0001 0.0062 0.0268 0.0085 0.0045 0.0099 0.0137 0.0828 0.0017
3 1.0166 2.4291 0.0009 0.0085 0.0173 0.0734 0.0054 0.0195 0.0126 0.0096 0.0021 0.0662 0.4302 0.0029 0.0057
4 0.9350 2.5328 0.0002 0.0266 0.0607 0.5501 0.0055 0.0047 0.0108 0.0173 0.0093 0.0083 0.0854 0.0059 0.4176
5 0.8266 2.6939 0.0014 0.4822 0.0403 0.0809 0.0009 0.0159 0.0511 0.0679 0.0007 0.0024 0.0189 0.8256 0.0092
6 0.6618 3.0106 0.0045 0.2191 0.2076 0.0401 0.0049 0.0049 0.0553 0.1430 0.0043 0.0117 0.0511 0.0742 0.0165
7 0.5151 3.4124 0.0000 0.0129 0.0014 0.1092 0.0044 0.0730 0.0929 0.0002 0.2376 0.2367 0.2360 0.0039 0.0048
8 0.4754 3.5521 0.0038 0.1403 0.0019 0.0329 0.0025 0.0465 0.5987 0.0358 0.0269 0.0028 0.0000 0.0601 0.0487
9 0.3613 4.0746 0.0067 0.0113 0.0835 0.0247 0.1190 0.3564 0.0331 0.0923 0.0032 0.1461 0.0264 0.1908 0.0244
10 0.3525 4.1254 0.0076 0.0422 0.0991 0.0000 0.0207 0.4401 0.0094 0.3247 0.1342 0.0178 0.0004 0.0420 0.0409
11 0.3327 4.2460 0.0033 0.0304 0.1213 0.0061 0.0419 0.0016 0.0044 0.0201 0.4339 0.4876 0.1328 0.1037 0.0014
12 0.1595 6.1332 0.0330 0.0107 0.0435 0.0408 0.7893 0.0240 0.0604 0.2574 0.0080 0.0004 0.0017 0.3932 0.1231
13 0.0682 9.3768 0.9360 0.0011 0.0067 0.0382 0.0005 0.0000 0.0379 0.0171 0.1285 0.0031 0.0001 0.0354 0.7200
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Note: P-Uncer = product demand uncertainty; S-Uncer = stock return uncertainty; Revers = reversibility; P-Comp = product market competition; S-Comp = competition in the IPO 













































Note: There are no intercepts in the likelihood of IPO models, which is a characteristic of partial likelihood estimates (Allison, 1995). This is because the intercept is an arbitrary 
function of time (depicted in the baseline model in Figure 4), which is cancelled out from the estimating equations in the model. The hazard ratio is the estimated percentage 
change in likelihood of IPO for one unit increase in the covariate. The likelihood of IPO can be obtained by subtracting 1.0 from the hazard ratio and multiplying it by 100. For 
example, in Model 1, an increase in Firm Age by one unit will yield an additional increase of likelihood of IPO by 4.1 % (1-1.041) x 100. 


















Firm Age 0.0401 1.041 0.0487 1.05 0.0527 1.054 0.0585 1.060
VC Age 0.2960 *** 1.344 0.28854 *** 1.334 0.29129 *** 1.338 0.2859 *** 1.331
Investments 0.0000 *** 1.000 5.34E-06 *** 1.000 5.47E-06 *** 1.000 5.40E-06 *** 1.000
MB Ratio 0.3138 *** 1.369 0.3202 *** 1.377 0.2340 *** 1.264 0.2396 *** 1.271
Bank Debt -0.0005 * 0.999 -0.0005 * 1.000 -0.0008 * 0.999 -0.0008 ** 0.999
P-Uncer -0.4371 * 0.646 -0.3466 + 0.707











R-Squared 0.4078   0.4269 0.4357    0.4522 
Likelihood Ratio 326.568  332.502 350.029   353.698
Base Model Comparison Model 1 Model 1 Model 1
Likelihood Ratio Test 11.87  *** 46.92     *** 54.26  ***
No. of Observations 211,627  211,627  211,627   211,627  
No. of IPO events 829      829    829      829    
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Control Model Uncertainty Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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Firm Age 0.0526 1.054 0.0504 1.038 0.0535 1.055 0.0606 1.062
VC Age 0.29119 *** 1.338 0.28086 *** 1.334 0.28776 *** 1.333 0.27549 *** 1.317
Investments 5.49E-06 *** 1.000 1.27E-05 *** 1.000 6.93E-06 *** 1.000 1.39E-05 *** 1.000
MB Ratio 0.2379 *** 1.269 0.3203 *** 1.361 0.2361 *** 1.266 0.2388 *** 1.27
Bank Debt -0.0008 + 0.999 -0.0005 ** 1.000 -0.0008 ** 0.999 -0.0008 ** 0.999
P-Uncer -0.6258 ** 0.707 -0.5333 ** 0.587





P-Uncer x Investments 3.41E-05 *** 1.000 3.39E-05 *** 1.000





R-Squared 0.4102   0.4276     0.4102      0.4531     
Likelihood Ratio 352.236  340.450    353.577      364.950    
Base Model Comparison Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 7Model 6
Irreversibility Model Autonomy Models
Model 5 Model 8
Likelihood Ratio Test 4.41     *** 15.90      *** 7.10        *** 22.50      ***
No. of Observations 211,627  211,627      211,627      211,627      
No. of IPO events 829      829        829         829        




























Firm Age 0.0417 1.043 0.0467 1.048 0.0526 1.054 0.0606 1.063 0.0065 1.054
VC Age 0.29045 *** 1.337 0.2893 *** 1.335 0.28336 *** 1.328 0.28697 *** 1.332 0.28247 *** 1.328
Investments 5.43E-06 *** 1.000 5.35E-06 *** 1.000 5.33E-06 *** 1.000 5.28E-06 *** 1.000 5.24E-06 *** 1.000
MB Ratio 0.2941 *** 1.342 0.3003 *** 1.350 0.3023 *** 1.353 0.2193 *** 1.245 0.2188 *** 1.353
Bank Debt -0.0004 + 1.000 -0.0004 + 1.000 -0.0003 + 1.000 -0.0007 + 0.999 -0.0006 * 1.000
P-Uncer 0.1320 1.141 0.1407 1.151
S-Uncer 0.1320 + 1.358 0.2351 1.265
Reversibility
P-Comp 0.7804 + 2.182 0.4750 1.608 0.3500 1.419




P-Uncer x P-Comp -3.3951 ** 0.034 -2.34E+00 * 0.096
S-Uncer x S-Comp 0.0113 * 1.011 1.21E-02 * 1.012
P-Shock
S-Shock
R-Squared 0.4081   0.4112 0.4389 0.4452   0.4914   
Likelihood Ratio 330.698  332.548 341.545 359.847  365.156  
Base Model Comparison Model 1 Model 1 Model 9 Model 10 Model 1
Likelihood Ratio Test 8.26     *** 11.96  *** 21.69  *** 54.60    *** 77.18    ***
No. of Observations 211,627  211,627  211,627  211,627    211,627    
No. of IPO events 829      829    829    829      829      
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1



















Firm Age 0.0670 1.069 0.0386 1.039
VC Age 0.27128 *** 1.312 0.29299 *** 1.340
Investments 1.39E-05 *** 1.000 5.44E-06 *** 1.000
MB Ratio 0.2221 *** 1.249 0.3299 *** 1.391
Bank Debt -0.0005 + 0.999 -0.0005 + 0.999
P-Uncer 0.0066 1.007




S-Uncer x Irr -0.9628 0.382
P-Uncer x Investments 3.37E-05 *** 1.000
S-Uncer x Investments -4.83E-06 * 1.000
P-Uncer x P-Comp -2.76E+00 * 0.063
S-Uncer x S-Comp 1.12E-02 + 1.011
P-Shock 2.15E-01 * 1.022
S-Shock 8.25E-03 1.008
R-Squared 0.4952         0.4206          
Likelihood Ratio 381.568        330.614        
Base Model Comparison Model 1 Model 1
Likelihood Ratio Test 110.00         *** 8.09            ***
No. of Observations 211,627         211,627          
No. of IPO events 829            829             
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1




 Table 23. Summary of Results 
 
Hypotheses Results 
H1A: High uncertainty in product demands will 
increase the likelihood of IPO launch. 
NOT SUPPORTED: Results supported counter 
Hypothesis2A 
H1B: High uncertainty in stock returns will increase 
the likelihood of IPO launch. 
SUPPORTED 
H2A: High uncertainty in product demands will 
decrease the likelihood of IPO launch. 
SUPPORTED  
H2B: High uncertainty in stock returns will decrease 
the likelihood of IPO launch.  
NOT SUPPORTED: Results supported counter 
Hypothesis1B 
H3: High levels of irreversibility will increase the 
negative relationship between product demand 
uncertainty and the likelihood of IPO launch. 
NOT SUPPORTED 
H4:   Uncertainty will positively influence the 
likelihood of IPO when firms have low levels of 
influence from VCs and negatively influence the 
likelihood of IPO when firms have high levels of 
influence from VCs in their decision making. 
MIXED SUPPORT: Results not supported for 
product market. However, partially supported 
for stock market. 
H5A: High levels of product market competition will 
increase the likelihood of IPO launch. 
SUPPORTED 
H5B: High levels of competition in the IPO offerings 
market will increase the likelihood of IPO 
launch. 
SUPPORTED 
H6A: The higher the level of product market 
competition, the level of product demand 
uncertainty will have a stronger negative effect 
on the likelihood of IPO launch. 
SUPPORTED 
H6B: The higher the level of competition in the IPO 
offerings market, the level of stock uncertainty 
will have a stronger positive effect on the 
likelihood of IPO launch. 
SUPPORTED 
H7A: The higher the increase in the product demand 
trend, the higher the likelihood of IPO launch. 
SUPPORTED 
H7B: The higher the increase in stock market return 
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Figure 3. Model and Hypothesized Relationships (Punctuated Time Flow) 
 






7b:  Stock   
return












: This baseline model depicts the cumulative function of IPO likelihood across time under the assumption that all 
covariates are zero. In other words, this baseline model describes the cumulative probability that a firm will launch 
an IPO, assuming that there are no exogenous influences. 
 139
 Figure 5. The Effect of Product Demand Uncertainty on Likelihood of IPO 
 
ote: This baseline model with P-Uncer depicts the influence of product demand uncertainty at two levels of uncertainty 
(10th percentile and 90th percentile) on the cumulative function of IPO likelihood across time, under the assumption 
that all other covariates are zero. Product demand uncertainty at the 10th percentile is labeled as ‘Low P-Uncer’ 
N
and product demand uncertainty at the 90th percentile is labeled as ‘High P-Uncer.’
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 Figure 6. The Effect of Stock Return Uncertainty on Likelihood of IPO 
Note: This baseline model with S-Uncer depicts the influence of stock return uncertainty at two levels of uncertainty (10th 
percentile and 90th percentile) on the cumulative function of IPO likelihood across time under the assumption that 
all other covariates are zero. Stock return uncertainty at the 10th percentile is labeled as ‘Low S-Uncer’ and stock 
return uncertainty at the 90th percentile is labeled as ‘High S-Uncer.’
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 Figure 7. Moderating Effects of VC Involvement on Product Demand Uncertainty 




















Note: The effect of the amount of venture capital investment received as a moderating variable on the effect of product 
demand uncertainty on the likelihood of IPO was produced by using estimates from Model 6 (Table 20). The 
horizontal axis represents the level of product demand uncertainty, and the vertical axis represents the likelihood of 
IPO.














Figure 8. Moderating Effects of VC Involvement on Stock Return Uncertainty and 
Likelihood of IPO 














Note: The effect of the amount of venture capital investment received as a moderating variable on the effect of stock 
return uncertainty on the likelihood of IPO was produced by using estimates from Model 7 (Table 20). The 
horizontal axis represents the level of stock return uncertainty, and the vertical axis represents the likelihood of 
IPO.
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 Figure 9. The Effect of Product Market Competition on Likelihood of IPO 
 
 
Note: This baseline model with P-Comp depicts the influence of product market competition (or the Blau Index) at two 
levels of competition (10th percentile and 90th percentile of the Blau Index) on the cumulative function of IPO 
likelihood across time under the assumption that all other covariates are zero. Product market competition at the 
10th percentile is described as ‘Low P-Comp’ and product market competition at the 90th percentile is described as 
‘High P-Comp.’
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unction of IPO likelihood across time under the assumption that all other covariates are zero. 
Competition in the IPO offerings market at the 10th percentile is described as ‘Low S-Comp’ and competition in 
the IPO offerings market at the 90th percentile is described as ‘High S-Comp.’
This baseline model with S-Comp depicts the influence of competition in the IPO offerings market (or the number 
of IPO launches at any given 12-month period) at two levels of competition (10th percentile and 90th percentile) on 
the cumulative f
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Note: The effect of competition in the product market as a moderating variable at high levels of competition and low 
levels of competition was produced by using estimates from Model 11 (Table 21). The horizontal axis represents 
the level of product demand uncertainty, and the vertical axis represents the likelihood of IPO.
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 Figure 12. Moderating Effects of Competition on Uncertainty and Likelihood of IPO 
rings Market) (IPO Offe














Note: The effect of competition in the IPO offerings market as a moderating variable at high levels of competitio d 
low levels of competition was produced by using estimates from Model 12 (Table 21). The horizontal axi
n an
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